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AS SEEN ON TV: THE NORMATIVE INFLUENCE
OF SYNDI-COURT ON CONTEMPORARY LITIGIOUSNESS
KIMBERLIANNE PODLAS*

I.

INTRODUCTION

A variety of disciplines have investigated the ability of the media, particularly television, to influence public perceptions.' Regardless of the theory employed, all posit that television content has
a reasonably direct and directional influence on viewer attitudes
and propensities to engage in certain behaviors. 2 This article extends this thesis to the impact of television representations of law: If
television content generally can impact public attitudes, then it is
reasonable to believe that television law specifically can do so. 3
Nevertheless, though television representations of law have become

* Kimberlianne Podlas, Assistant Professor, Caldwell College, Caldwell, New
Jersey. B.A., 1988, SUNY Buffalo; J.D., 1991, SUNY Buffalo School of Law. Please
direct comments regarding this article to: kpodlas@buffalo.com.
1. SeeALBERT BANDURA, SOCIAL LEARNING THEORY 64-68 (1977) (discussing social learning via television as model); see alsoJAMES SH-ANAHAN & MICHAEL MORGAN,
TELEVISION AND ITS VIEWERS, CULTIVATION THEORY AND RESEARCH 172 (1999) (discussing cultivation theory); Neal R. Feigenson & Daniel S. Bailis, Air Bag Safety:
Media Coverage, PopularConceptions, and Public Policy, 7 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y & L.
444, 447 (2001) (exploring cognitive psychology).
2. See Feigenson & Bailis, supra note 1, at 446. Generally, media coverage can
influence behaviors that are and are not socially desirable. See id. at 446-47.
3. See American Bar Association Report on Perceptions of the U.S. Justice System, 62
ALB. L. REV. 1307, 1315 (1999) (describing media's ability to impact some people's
knowledge of law); see also Hon. Judith S. Kaye, Rethinking TraditionalApproaches, 62
ALB. L. REv. 1491, 1491 (1999) (observing people's experience with law includes
watching Judge Judy); cf. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Va., 448 U.S. 555, 572
(1980) (noting "educative effect" of open proceedings on public expanded by media reporting from court).
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if any, has neither been deubiquitous, 4 the extent of their impact,
5
precision.
with
fined nor measured
In the last decade, television has given birth to a new source of
legal "information": the syndicated television courtroom or "syndicourt."' 6 Though the public previously has seen law on the televi-

sion screen, it has never seen reality law in such a constant, uniform
way. Just as other media sources of law signal both social and legal
rules about litigation, so too does syndi-court. Syndi-court is thus

poised to exert some influence on viewer belief systems regarding
the methods and acceptability of disputing.
This article examines syndi-court's influence on beliefs and potential actions regarding litigation, both in terms of pursuing litigation and pro se representation upon litigation. The analysis
presents three interrelated empirical studies. These studies explore
the content of syndi-court, any association between its messages and
the beliefs of its viewers regarding litigation, litigiousness, and pro
se disputing, and the potential for converting these beliefs to litigious behaviors.
After painting a picture of a litigious culture, this paper
presents statistical evidence disputing this mythology. Having set
up such juxtaposition between belief and reality, the article contemplates explanations for this disconnect, as well as the prevalence of
this belief. Next, relying on cultivation theory, the article posits
that the media has contributed significantly to the phenomenon of
increasing litigiousness. Then, recognizing the potential power of
the media, in particular, television imagery, in cultivating messages
about the law and legal system, the article identifies our strongest
4. See Kimberlianne Podlas, Please Adjust Your Signal: How Television's Syndicated Courtrooms Bias OurJuror Citizenry, 39 Am. Bus. L.J. 1, 24 (2001) (concluding
television's ubiquity creates our reality); see also Michael Asimow, Bad Lawyers in the
Movies, 24 NovA L. REv. 533, 552 (2000) (concluding access to fictitious lawyers on
television and film teach viewers what lawyers do and how justice system works).
5. See David A. Harris, The Appearance of Justice: Court TV, Conventional Television, and Public Understandingof the CriminalJustice System, 35 ARiz. L. REv. 785, 786
(1993) (theorizing inaccurate information in media could damage perceptions of
judicial system); see also Ralph E. Roberts, Jr., An Empirical and Normative Analysis of
the Impact of Televised Courtroom Proceedings, 51 SMU L. REV. 621, 634 (1998) (explaining that little, if any, research has quantified impact of televised court proceedings on public). "[T] here is little empirical data that measures how much of
an educational impact televised court proceedings have upon the public." Id.; cf
Christo Lassiter, TVor Not TV- That Is the Question, 86J. CRuM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
928, 958-73 (1996) (discussing cameras in courtroom).
6. See Mark Jurkowitz, Hour ofJudgment, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 3, 2000, at 9; see
also Here Come the Judges, EBONY, May 2002, at 96 (noting popularity of syndicated
TV courts). For a discussion of syndicated television courtrooms, see infra notes
147, 150-53 and accompanying text.
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television messenger of law, the syndicated television courtroom.

The characteristics of syndi-court and its potential for social influence are outlined.
Having established the theoretical construct of syndi-court influence, this hypothesis is tested through three related studies.
First, a content analysis of the four most popular syndi-courts is reported. This analysis clarifies the primary messages and prevalence
of pro se litigation and litigants on the television screen. Second, a
study of 241 prospective jurors ("Juror Study") is recounted. This
study focused on degree of syndi-court viewing, attitudes about litigation, and views consistent with predominant syndi-court imagery.
Third, this research was refined and replicated in studies of juryeligible adults who were enrolled in college ("Eligibles Studies").
These studies also collected data regarding attitudes toward litigation and pro se representation as well as factors that might mediate
these propensities.
The data from the Juror Study and Eligibles Studies are
presented independently and, where possible, via meta-analysis. In
sum, the results of the analyses converge to suggest frequent viewing of syndi-court predicts beliefs encouraging litigation, pro se representation, and even future acts of litigiousness.
II.

BACKGROUND

A.

Our Litigious Culture
It is hardly radical to note America's litigation explosion. 7 If
the rhetoric is believed, over the last few decades, American society
has become a highly litigious one, 8 where Americans "believe the
7. See VALERIE P. HANS, BUSINESS ON TRIAL: THE CrVIL JURY AND CORPORATE
RESPONSIBILITY 9 (2000) [hereinafter BUSINESS] (noting some analysts assert

change in legal culture, while others claim Americans have become increasingly

litigious); see also Senator Spencer Abraham, Litigation's Stranglehold on Charities,85
POLICY REv., Sept./Oct. 1997, at 57 (noting current "litigation explosion"); Maurice Rosenberg, Civil Justice Research and Civil Justice Reform, 15 LAw & Soc'v REv.
473, 473 (1980-81) (remarking on litigation explosion); Maurice Rosenberg, Let's
Everybody Litigate?, 50 TEX. L. REv. 1349, 1349 (1972);John Leo, The World's Most
Litigious Nation, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 22, 1995, at 24; Suzanne L. Oliver,
Let the Loser Pay, FORBES, Mar. 18, 1991, at 96 (stating U.S. has 3 times as many
lawyers per capita, 30 times as many malpractice claims, and 100 times as many
product liability claims as Britain).
One study found 94% of executives believed litigation had exploded over the
last decade. SeeJohn Lande, FailingFaith in Litigation?A Survey of Business Lawyers'
and Executives' Opinions, 3 HARv. NEGOT. L. REv. 1, 26 (1998).
8. See Mark A. Hoffman, Common Good Fights Against Litigious Culture, Bus. INS.,
Apr. 29, 2002, at 40 (explaining how "culture of litigiousness" is fundamental problem in society); see also BUSINESS, supra note 7, at 56 (illustrating public opinion
surveys and increases in court filings); WALTER K OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLO-
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right to sue is a birthright."9 "The whole legal culture nowadays
sees litigation as a good thing, something to be cheered." 10 In fact,
viable legal claims no longer seem to be a prerequisite to entering
the courtroom and obtaining a verdict. 1 Rather, plaintiffs, emboldened by out of control juries 12 with Robin Hood attitudes, 13
now litigate all manner of trivialities. 14 Indeed, businesses, special
interest groups, and their political allies complain that many suits

WHAT HAPPENED WHEN AMERICA UNLEASHED THE LAWSUIT 254-56 (1992)
(describing litigation increase from mid-1940s to present day); David M. Trubek,
Studying Courts in Context, 15 LAw & Soc'y REv. 485, 485 (1980-81) (noting "excessive litigiousness" of Americans).
Indeed, the Republican Party's 1994 "Contract With America" proclaimed,
"[a]lmost everyone agrees America has become a litigious society: we sue each
SION:

other too often and too easily." Mark Sauer, Taming Trouble Torts: Some Wonder
Whether Reports of Litigation Explosion Were Overblown, S.D. UNION TRIB., Apr. 21,
2002, at H-1, H-6. For a more detailed discussion of the "Contract With America,"
see infra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
9. William Mullen, U.S. Seeks a Cure to Legal Dilemma, CHI. TRIB.,July 26, 1991,
§ 1, at 15 (discussing tort reform in light of overwhelming litigation increase).
10. Oliver, supra note 7, at 96 (quoting Walter Olson during interview included in article).
11. SeeJoseph F. Speelman, The MTBE Controversy: Defending Mass Tort Claims,
69 DEF. COUNSEL J. 35, 35 (2002) (asserting tort suits "extort major corporations
and small businesses into massive settlements without ever resolving the validity of
the claims on the merits"); see also Mark N. Vamos, Editorial, The Verdict from the
Corner Office (Business Week/Harris Executive Poll), Bus. WK., Apr. 3, 1992, at 66
(describing unfair lawsuits against business defendants).
In fact, 80% of citizens surveyed believe rising costs of lawsuits are due to
plaintiffs trying to make money. See THOMAS H. KOENIG & MICHAEL L. RUSTAD, IN
DEFENSE OF TORT LAW 64 (2001).
12. SeeJennifer K. Robbennolt, DeterminingPunitive Damages: EmpiricalInsights
and Implicationsfor Reform, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 103, 105 (2002) (stating critics contend
juries are capricious, biased toward plaintiffs, and overgenerous); see also Marc S.
Galanter, The Day After the LitigationExplosion, 46 MD. L. REv. 3, 4 (1986) [hereinafter LitigationExplosion] (noting increasing concern regarding excessive legalization
of American society). See generally Marc S. Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell: Contemporary Legends About the CivilJustice System, 40 ARIz. L. REv. 717 (1998) [hereinafter Oil
Strike] (noting legal system having spun out of control).
13. See BUSINESS, supra note 7, at 13, 178 (telling juries are believed to redistribute wealth); see also Robbennolt, supra note 12, at 105 (reporting critics insist
juries fuel litigation crisis).
14. See Vamos, supra note 11, at 66 (noting many businesses fear they will be
sued unfairly).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol11/iss1/1

4

2004]

Podlas: As Seen on TV: The Normative Influence of Syndi-Court on Contempo
SYNDI-COURT & CONTEMPORARY LITIGIOUSNESS

are nothing more than unjustified
17
for deep pockets.

15

5

lotteries 16 for plaintiffs looking

15. See Robbennolt, supra note 12, at 114 (stating litigation is expensive).
Such legal myths have become folklore - they have multiple versions, no single
authoritative text, are formulaic and anonymous, and "are conveyed in settings
detached from any practices of active testing for veracity." Oil Strike, supra note 12,
at 723; see also Marc S. Galanter, Readingthe Landscapeof Disputes: What We Know and
Don't Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society,
31 UCLA L. REv. 4, 8-12 (1983) [hereinafter Landscape of Disputes] (discussing excessive litigation by Americans).
Businesses must respond even when suits are frivolous, and this response
translates to expense. See Andrew Wood, Legal Costs Too High?: Try Alternative Dispute Resolution, 160 CHEMICAL WK. 33, 34 (Nov. 4, 1998) (remarking PricewaterhouseCoopers estimates legal spending for chemical companies as 0.42% of
yearly revenue); see also Sauer, supra note 8, at H-6 (relating how one vice president
complained, "a company can spend millions defending itself against ... frivolous
suits"); RichardJ. Rosenthal, Mediation as an Affirmative Business Strategy, HAw. PAC.
ARCHITECTURE 13 (Jan. 1995) (discussing how business defendants must contend
with "spiraling legal fees" of litigation), available at http://www.mediate.com/articles/rosenthall.cfm (last visited Oct. 21, 2002)).
If news of suit spreads, regardless of the claim's underlying validity, copycat
suits may abound, further increasing "response costs." See Brian D. Beglin & David
M. Cohen, Tiptoeing Through Mass Tort Litigation, 48 RISK MGMT., Apr. 2001, at 63
(describing how, within days, a "trickle of legal complaints" can evolve into flood
of complaints); see also Oliver, supra note 7, at 97 (recounting suits from bystander
defendants); Editorial, Big Punitive Award Threatens Justice, SEATTLE
POST-INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 13, 1999, at All (asserting large damage awards en-

courage "flood of copycat suits motivated by fantasies of a big payday"). Even suits
devoid of merit can cause public image problems for a business. See Speelman,
supra note 11, at 45 (noting companies cast into role of tort defendants are commonly forced to defend products in media). Regardless of trial outcomes, businesses will often find their reputations damaged. See America's Love Affair with
Litigation Means New Laws for PA 56 PR NEWS, June 26, 2000, at I (discussing damage to business reputation resulting from frivolous suits); see also BUSINESS, supra
note 7, at 4-5 (discussing how litigation alleging DuPont withheld toxicity test results of Benlate DF harmed DuPont's image).
16. See Sheila L. Birnbaum & Malcolm Wheeler, Punitive Damages Law Paves
Way for Massive Design-Defect Awards, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 17, 1986, at 40 (describing
punitive damages as lottery system). Others have likened punitive damage awards
to "Russian roulette": "The chamber may be larger than we thought ... [b]ut
there's still that one bullet . . .

."

Edward Felsenthal, Punitive Awards Are Called

Modest, Rare, WALL ST. J., June 17, 1996, at B4 (quoting Washington defense-bar
specialist, Victor Schwartz).
17. See Valerie P. Hans, The Illusions and Realities ofJurors' Treatment of Corporate
Defendants, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 327, 329 (1998) [hereinafter Illusions] (noting negative predisposition of jury toward corporate defendants). Some businesses claim
victimization by civil juries who rule against them based on a "deep pockets" rationale rather than the evidence. Id.; see also BUSINESS, supra note 7, at 13 (stating

ubiquitous belief that juries base their decisions on "deep pocket" rationale).
Lawyers have also been blamed for the litigation explosion, because more litigation means more business for them. See Paul Sweeney, Keeping Legal Costs Down,
FIN. EXECUTIVE, Dec. 2001, at 47, 48 (describing "litigation machine" created by

lawyers to pool resources and increase business litigation and noting litigation
"driven by plaintiff attorneys who seek out claims on behalf of consumers"); see also
Michael Kirsch, Lauyers, Heal Thyselves, 85 A.B.A.J., May 1999, at 96 (noting lawyers
contribute to "litigomania"); Leo, supra, note 7, at 24 (stating trial lawyers promote
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This court-sanctioned redistribution 1 8 of wealth' 9 is problematic not only for business defendants, but also for the public. 20 Certainly, defending a tort case is expensive, 21 but that expense is
amortized beyond the individual disputes. 22 For instance, litigation
also increases the costs of doing business, 23 of insurance, 24 and of
"litigation lottery"); OLSON, supra note 8, 247-70 (accusing lawyers of prompting
plaintiffs to sue and churning out 'Junk litigation").
18. There is a suspicion that, compared to judges, who are likely to be wealthier, jurors enact "redistributive inclinations" and biases in their awards against
wealthy defendants. See Robbennolt, supra note 12, at 155-56 (comparing wealth of
judges and jurors and noting biases latter may have against certain defendants).
19. See BUSINESS, supra note 7, at 13 (reporting notion that jurors redistribute
wealth from rich corporations to poor plaintiffs). This belief system has led many
to criticize tort litigation. See, e.g., PHILIP K. HoWARD, THE COLLAPSE OF THE COMMON GOOD: How AMERICA'S LAWSUIT CULTURE UNDERMINES OUR FREEDOM 23
(2001) ("Courts are not supposed to be commercial establishments where, for the
price of a lawyer, anyone can buy a chance at a raffle.").
20. See David Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV.
72, 74 (1983) [hereinafter Trubek] (noting wide belief "that the costs of litigation
are rising and that these costs are an important public problem").
21. See Robbennolt, supra note 12, at 114 (stating litigation is expensive).
"Anyone can file a suit forcing a corporation to spend millions defending itself,
and those costs are passed on to [consumers]." Sauer, supra note 8, at H-1 (quoting Adrienne Kotner of Citizens Against Lawsuit Abuse organization). In particular, defending a business can cost millions of dollars. See id. at H-6.
22. See Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort
Litigation System -And Why Not?, 140 U. PENN. L. REv. 1147, 1281-82 (1992) [hereinafter Do We Know] (reporting major expense of litigation is transaction costs).
23. See Sandra L. Christensen & Brian Grinder, Justice and Financial Market
Allocation of the Social Costs of Business, 29 J. Bus. ETHICS 105, 105 (2001) (stating
costs of product-related litigation are "taken into the firm").
24. See KOENIG & RUSTAD, supra note 11 (noting some blame damage awards
for causing businesses to cancel insurance). The Insurance Information Institute
estimates that the legal tab of court costs, attorney's fees, insurance premiums, and
payouts amount to $161 billion or 2% of the U.S. Gross Domestic Product. See
Sweeney, supra note 17, at 47. Another source estimates litigation costs, including
legal fees, jury awards, copying, and organization costs, to be $100 billion to $300
billion. This does not include indirect costs, such as damages to corporate reputation and increased day-to-day business costs. See Michael Netzley, Alternative Dispute
Resolution: A Business (and) Communication Strategy, 64 Bus. COMM. Q. 83 (2001)
(discussing advantages of alternative dispute resolution). Businesses can employ a
variety of methods to keep liability insurance costs down. For example, Chubb
Insurance reduces employment practices liability insurance for companies who
participate in its certified training programs. See Sweeney, supra note 17, at 47; see
also Sally Roberts, Steps Can Be Taken to Limit Exposure to Punitive Damages, 35 Bus.
INS., May 14, 2001, at 50, 52-53 (advising companies to purchase insurance to cover
damage awards; "general rule of thumb is $1,000 per $1 million in limits").
Additionally, businesses should be careful not to inflate insurance costs with
their "sky-is-falling" rhetoric. Saks asserts that the irrational fear of lawsuits causes
increased costs, because insurers insist on excessive reserves and products are not
produced. See Do We Know, supra note 22, at 1284-85; see also Timothy R. Brown,
Group Puts Price Tag on Legal System, COMMERCIAL APPEAL (TENN.), Apr. 17, 2002, at
DS1 (noting consumer litigation leads to "increase[d] insurance rates").
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consumer products. 25 This so-called "tort tax" has been estimated
26
at $300 billion per year.

The risk of litigation may even deter businesses from developing new products, 27 and contribute to the decline of the economy. 28 One survey found that 60% of corporate executives insisted
that civil litigation hampered the ability of U.S. businesses to compete globally.

29

The contemporary litigation explosion was identified in the
1970s, 30 and reached the pinnacle of public awareness with the Republican Party's 1994 Contract With America. 3 1 The Contract With
America's "Common Sense Legal Reform" component used the explosion to justify a number of tort reforms to limit litigation, its

attendant costs, and jury awards. 32

The policy's supporters

25. See Brown, supra note 24, at DS1 (stating litigation causes consumers to
pay more for products).
26. See Leo, supra note 7, at 24-25; see also PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE

(1988).
One author claims that "tort taxes" increase the cost of an $80 ladder to $100
and a $15,000 pacemaker to $18,000 as business seeks to account for perceived
future litigation costs. See Leo, supra note 7, at 24-25. Saks, however, has suggested
that this fear of litigation is unfounded and unreasonably pushes up product prices
and insurance costs. See Do We Know, supra note 22, at 1284-85.
27. See BUSINESS, supra note 7, at 14 (noting unpredictability of civil juries
blamed for preventing innovation of US businesses); see also Anderson v. OwensCorning Fiberglas Corp., 810 P.2d 549, 556 (Cal. 1991) (stating manufacturers,
uncertain on how to limit risks, will be discouraged from creating new products for
fear new products will beget liability); cf. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt. v. Kelco
Disposal Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 282 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing excessive punitive damage awards chill creation of new
products).
28. See KOENIG & RUSTAD, supra note 11 (noting critics blame punitive damage
awards for U.S. economic decline).
29. See Vamos, supra note 11, at 66; see also Hoffman, supra note 8, at 40 (stating fear of claims "paralyze" business); Jeffrey Rothfeder, Living with Litigation, 173
CHIEF EXECUTIVE, Dec. 2001, at 20 (noting decisions regarding litigation are
among most critical for CEOs).
30. See generally W. Lee Pittman & Bert S. Nettles, Debate: What Is the Role or
Function of Punitive Damages?, 24 CUMB. L. REv. 453 (1994) (discussing function of
punitive damages); Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Historical Continuity of
PunitiveDamages Awards: Reforming the Tort Reformers, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 1269 (1993)
(discussing functions of punitive damages).
31. See Lisa L. Posey, The Impact of Fee-Shifting Tort Reform on Out-of-Court Settlements, 23J. INS. ISSUES 124, 125 (2000) (observing tort reform entrance into federal
debate). The Contract With America proclaimed, "[a]lmost everyone agrees
America has become a litigious society .... " Sauer, supra note 8, at H-6.
32. See Posey, supra note 31, at 124-25 (discussing various measures of tort
reform). The typical tort reform agenda includes caps on damage awards, creation of new costs and procedural barriers to filing of suits, higher burdens of proof
for plaintiffs, enhanced affirmative defenses for defendants, limitations on liability
for joint tortfeasors, and elimination of certain legal doctrines. See Robert S. Peck,
LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
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preached only tort reform could avert damage to American society
and our economy.

33

B.

A Myth Exposed

Although these beliefs in American litigiousness are deep, they

34
seem more popular mythology than empirically-supported reality.

Proof of a tort litigation explosion or a cultural litigiousness would
require evidence of either an increase in the proportion of people
suing or an increase in the number of people suing over issues previously ignored.3 5 Yet, excluding the unique products liability cases
37
36
of the 1970s and 1980s, statistics support neither.

Instead, once adjusted for population growth, statistical evidence not only disputes an increase in litigation, 38 but also suggests
a decline over the last decade. Indeed, a study sponsored by the
Georgia Civil Justice Foundation and the Georgia State Bar Association found tort lawsuits had. declined from 1994 to 1997.39 Another,
Defending the American System ofJustice, 37 TRIAL,Apr. 2001, at 18, 20 (characterizing
"tort restrictionism" version of tort reform).
The Supreme Court has also imposed constitutional limits on punitive damage awards. See, e.g., BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 585-86 (1996) (holding
BMW's conduct not egregious enough to merit punitive damages rising to level of
"severe criminal penalty" beyond constitutional limits).
33. See Litigation Explosion, supra note 12, at 4-5 (portraying outcry from business and government on explosion of litigation "mark[ing] America's moral
decline).
34. See Sauer, supra note 8, at H-1 (statistics do not support notion of "suehappy society").
35. See John A. Stookey, Trials and Tribulations: Crises, Litigation, and Legal
Change, 24 LAw & Soc'v REv. 497, 497-98 (1990) (explaining role of litigation in
society). Litigation rates measure the frequency of disputes and the willingness
and ability of individuals to "convert" those disputes into litigation. See id.
36. See BUSINESS, supranote 7, at 9 (recounting high-visibility liability and class
actions). Specifically, a majority of the 1980s tort cases involved automobile-related claims. See id. at 57.
37. See id. at 52-58 (recounting debate over existence of litigation explosion).
For a discussion of the absence of statistical support, see infra notes 38-49 and
accompanying text.
38. See generally KOENIG & RusTAD, supra note 11 (disputing myths of litigiousness, runaway juries, and need for tort reform); see also Litigation Explosion, supra
note 12, 6-7 (illustrating declining per capita rates of filing between 1981 and
1984); Landscape of Disputes, supra note 15, 36-51 (debunking litigation crisis and
suggesting caseload increases merely tracked population growth and certain product liability cases, like asbestos litigation); Do We Know, supra note 22, at 1184 (stating claims of litigation explosion are overblown); Marc Galanter, Contemporary
Legends About the CivilJustice System, 35 TRIAL, Jul. 1999, at 60 [hereinafter Legends]
(refuting belief of litigiousness as 'Jaundiced view"). The rhetoric of large damage
awards is similarly "uninformed by empirical research." Robbennolt, supra note
12, at 107.
39. This study concluded the "litigation explosion" was merely "popular and
political rhetoric." Bill Rankin, ATLANTA CONST., Feb. 9, 2000, at C3 (reporting
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commissioned by the National Center for State Courts, found, in

sixteen states, the number of tort suits had declined throughout the
1990s.40 Similarly, when allegations are measured in terms of mal-

practice suits alone, statistics demonstrate that malpractice suits
have actually declined more than 25% since 1994.41
Just as claims of present increases in litigation are of a questionable character, so are claims of an emergence of "litigiousness"
among Americans. Reputed scholars, such as Michael Saks and
Marc Galanter, respectively, have conducted a number of studies
investigating this claim from both a psychological and socio-legal
perspective. Their studies have found that most people entitled to
bring legal claims do not do so. 42 This low ratio of claims to lawsuits43 demonstrates, if anything, that Americans tend to avoid disUniversity of Georgia study); see also Sauer, supra note 8, at H-i (noting Judicial
Council of California found 50% drop in personal-injury suits over last fifteen
years).
40. See William Glaberson, Ideas & Trends: The $2.9 Million Cup of Coffee; When
the Verdict Is just a Fantasy, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1999, at 4.1 (reporting National
Center for State Courts study).
41. See KOENIG & RUSTAD, supra note 11, at 64 (using statistics of states to
dispute claim that medical malpractice suits are increasing); see also Abbot S.
Brown, The Med-Mal Suit Explosion That Isn't, N.J. LAw., Apr. 1, 2002, at 1 (contrasting insurance industry claims against New Jersey statistics of suits).
The media commonly misreport quantitative data, failing to distinguish raw
numerical increases from proportional increases. Americans are also guilty of
these errors. See Charles R. Berger, Making It Worse than It Is: QuantitativeDepiction
of Threatening Trends in the News, J. COMM. 655, 656-67, 675 (2001) (observing
"Americans are particularly inept at handling quantitative data").
42. See Do We Know, supra note 22, at 1185 (stating victims tend not to complain); see also BUSINESS, supranote 7, at 55-58 (recounting 1991 Rand Study showing vast majority of potential plaintiffs did not resort to legal disputes); Trubek,
supranote 20, at 86-87 (noting only about 10% of sampled cases actually end up in
court). But see William L.F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming.... 15 LAw & Soc'v REv. 631, 636 (1980-81) (stating "small fraction of injurious experiences" mature into disputes); Michael
Rustad, In Defense of Punitive Damages in Products Liability: Testing Tort Anecdotes with
Empirical Data, 78 IowA L. REv. 1, 2 nn.1-5 (Oct. 1992) (discussing skyrocketing of
punitive damages); Ted Rohrlich, We Aren't Seeing You in Court; Americans Aren't
Suing Each Other as Often as They Did a Decade Ago, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2001, at Al
(reporting legal scholars and survey by Rand Corporation's "Institute for CivilJustice" suggest only small percentage of injured Americans litigate).
43. See BUSINESS, supra note 7, at 56 (noting low ratio of potential legal claims
to suits); see also Richard Birke & Craig R. Fox, Psychological Principlesin Negotiating
Civil Settlements, 4 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 1, 1 (1999) (stating 5% to 7% of claims
filed result in settlement). Less than 5% of all civil suits filed result in a verdict.
Id. Of the remainder, almost 90% settle. See Marc S. Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most
Cases Settle": Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1339,
1340 n.2 (1994) (discussing sample of distinct court cases going to trial arbitration,
dismissal, or settled).
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puting. 44 Furthermore, even when they do complain in a legal
venue, plaintiffs are not rewarded with lottery-sized verdicts. 45 Instead, it seems thatjuries are biased against plaintiffs, often blaming
them for their fates, 46 and undercompensating them for cata47
strophic injuries.
C.

The Media as Storyteller

The drastic disconnect between the perception and reality of
litigation rates raises the question of why such deep-seated cultural
and political beliefs persist. While some attribute the mythology of
the litigious American to sloppy legal scholarship, 48 and others to
business propaganda 49 intended to influence juries and legal reforms, 50 another explanation is the media.

In disseminating information, the media does more than
merely neutrally inform the public. Instead, by selecting stories
44. See Do We Know, supra note 22, at 1183 (declaring "remarkable" how few
plaintiffs there are in tort system); see also Wood, supra note 15, at 33 (noting most
attrition of disputes occurs early).
45. See Marc Galanter, Pick a Number, Any Number, Am. LAw., Apr. 1992, at 82,
84.
46. See BUSINESS, supra note 7, at 216-17 (stating empirical studies do not support myth of jurors as pro-plaintiff); see also Mark Madell, OvercomingJurorBias: Is
There an Answer?, 36 TL,
July 2000, at 28 (noting jurors judge plaintiffs harshly).
47. See Rustad, supra note 42, at 62-64 (noting stance juries take when awarding punitive damages if plaintiff played significant role in injury).
In fact, the Civil Trial Court Network Project study demonstrated awards
against business defendants were lower than those against non-business defendants.
See BUSINESS, supra note 7, at 217 (stating evidence does not support anti-business
bias of jurors). But see Brian J. Ostrom et al., A Step Above Anecdote: A Profile of the
Civil Jury in the 1990s, 79 JUDIcAruRE 233, 236-37 (1996) (stating juries tend to
award larger sums when defendant is business); Do We Know, supra note 22, at 121823 (noting awards roughly proportional to injury, but significant horizontal inequity remains). See generally Michael J. Saks et al., Reducing Variability in Civil Jury
Awards, 21 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 243, 243 (1997) (noting settlements under compensate plaintiffs for their economic losses).
48. See David A. Kaplan, The U.S. Litigiousness Myth, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 6, 1984, at
2, 44 (remarking litigiousness myth perpetrated by sloppy legal scholarship).
49. See Report Disputes View that Jurors Are Lavish With Punitive Damages, S.D.
UNION-TRIB., Aug. 6, 2001, at A-6 (reporting comprehensive study by Eisenberg
and Wells of 8,724 trials shows juries not overly prone to award punitive damages).
Scholars at the 1998 Clifford Symposium on Tort Law and Public Policy,
hosted by DePaul Law School, disputed the notion that jurors hold an anti-business bias. See Roscoe Pound Foundation Civil Justice Digest, DePaul Symposium
Challenges Civil Jury Myths, available at http://www.roscoepound.org/new/digest/
spr98.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2004) (reporting highlights of Symposium).
50. See BUSINESS, supra note 7, at 14, 50 (noting general belief of litigation
explosion). Corporations have tried to avoid corporate responsibility by leading a
battle for tort reform. See Peck, supra note 32, at 18-19.
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and determining their prominence and content,5 1 it orients the audience toward a particular perspective on the information reported.5 2 Often, public opinion develops in line with the perceived
media slant."

For instance, a content analysis of 2,696 articles disclosed that
community perceptions of fundamentalist Christians tend to track
54
the media coverage and portrayal of fundamentalists in their area.
Positive coverage begets positive attitudes and negative coverage begets negative ones.5 5 Similarly, another study found people exposed to The New York Times for five consecutive days adjusted their
overall agendas to conform, in part, with those implied by the
56
newspaper.
Television commentary also influences viewer judgments. A
study of ninety-six children showed that their approval of soccer
fouls conformed to the opinion of voice-over commentary. 57 When
the commentator disapproved of the player's aggressiveness, chil-

51. Stories in the media focus on identifiable, iconic aspects to simplify reality

for viewers. See Mira Sotirovic, Media Use and Perceptions of Welfare, J. COMM. 750,
752 (2001) (arguing coverage of welfare "reduce[s] reality to a few caricatures");
see also Scott L. Althaus & David Tewksbury, Agenda Setting and the "New" News,
Patterns of Issue Importance Among Readers of the Paper and On-line Versions of the New
York Times, 29 COMM. REs. 180, 182 (2002) (detailing how newspaper format defines "a hierarchy of stories"); Jeremy H. Lipschultz & Michael L. Hilt, Mass Media
and the Death Penalty: Social Constructions of Three Nebraska Executions, 43 J. BROADCASTING & ELECTRONIC MEDIA 236, 240 (1999) (introducing idea of mass media
creating social myths and constructing social reality through its messages).
52. See Peter A. Kerr & Patricia Moy, Newspaper Coverage of Fundamentalist Christians 1980-2000, 79J. & MASS COMM. Q. 54-72 (2002).
53. See Sei-Hill Kim et al., Think About It This Way: Attribute Agenda-Setting Function of the Press and the Public's Evaluation of a Local Issue, 79J. MASS COMM. Q. 7, 8
(2002); see also Lipschultz & Hilt, supra note 51, at 240 (noting media plays indirect
but significant long-term role in shaping thoughts, actions, and social myths); Sotirovic, supra note 51, at 752 (explaining coverage of welfare "reduce [s] reality to a
few caricatures").
54. See Kerr & Moy, supra note 52, at 48, 60-69.
55. See id.
56. See Althaus & Tewksbury, supra note 51, at 196 (observing findings of
study where "two dimensions of media exposure were examined"). Indeed, news is
a social construction of reality. See Kerr & Moy, supra note 52, at 55.
Recently, Serbian president, Slobodan Milosevic, harnessed television to promote his agenda and to spawn ethnic hatred. See Daniel Deluce, Media Wars, 48
NATO REv. 16 (2000-01) (describing television as "most powerful tool" to spawn
propaganda of ethnic hatred).
57. See Johannes W. J. Beentjes et al., How Television Commentary Affects Children'sJudgments on SoccerFouls, 29 COMM. REs. 31, 35-36 (2002) (describing method
utilized in study). In this study, two groups of children were shown identical soccer games, but one version featured commentary criticizing fouls. See id.
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dren rejected the foul more strongly than when the commentator
58
approved of the player's actions.

It is, thus, reasonable to presume this media effect can even
extend to attitudes and beliefs about the law. Philip K Howard,
author of The Death of Common Sense, described that interaction:
Americans today seem to abide by a kind of law by journalism, reacting to whatever risks newspapers write about.
Several New York private schools instituted peanut-free
cafeterias after publicity about horrible reactions that can
occur in people born with the peanut allergy. [Yet,]
[n]ationally, only a few people every year die from allergic
reactions to food of all kinds .... 59
Indeed, media reports have been shown to contribute to juror
opinions about civil litigation and damage awards. 60 Unfortunately,
however, the majority of contemporary news reports of jury decision-making inaccurately represent civil litigation. Content analyses
of tort litigation stories show that media coverage overrepresents
products liability and medical malpractice cases, including the
number that go to trial, the number the plaintiff wins, large damage awards, 61 and punitive damages. 62 This overrepresentation
skews public perception of litigation 63 and tort awards, leading it to
believe such awards are common. For instance, although a 1996
study disclosed damages over $1 million were awarded in barely 8%
of all awards, 64 11% of citizens sampled believed multi-million dol58. See id. at 34, 38-41 (describing methodology used in study and subsequent
results). Moreover, the commentary may be perceived as punishing or rewarding.
See id. at 35-36. This has the effect of "framing" the sporting event. See id. at 33.
59. HowARD, supra note 19, 11-12 (discussing influence of media reports on
American public's "legal anxiety").
60. See Robbennolt, supra note 12, at 118 (analyzing empirical research on
jury decision making process on punitive damages); see also BUSINESS, supra note 7,
at 70-71 (maintaining media and advertising influence people's view of litigation as
unrestrained).
61. See Robbennolt, supra note 12, at 126 (discussing how skewed reports of
civil litigation contribute to perceptions of civil justice system); see also BMW of N.
Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568-86 (1996) (discussing car repair tort and punitive damages); Liebeck v. McDonald's Rests., 1995 WL 360309 (D.N.M. Aug. 18,
1994) (describing coffee spill tort); Daniel S. Bailis & RobertJ. MacCoun, Estimating Liability Risks with the Media as Your Guide, 20 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 419, 420
(1996) (explaining media distortions).
62. See Robbennolt, supra note 12, at 126 (stating there is misconception in
believing punitive damages are customary and substantially large).
63. See id. (stating overrepresentation of cases affects public perception).
64. See Ostrom et al., supra note 47, at 235-38 (interpreting data on jury
awards in state courts).
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lar damage awards were common in 50% of all court cases. 65 Another study suggested that reports of high damage awards anchor
jury damage determinations by defining what is an injury-appropriate sum.

66

D.

Function of Media Coverage

Accordingly, media coverage of litigation contributes to the
persistence of beliefs in a litigation explosion. 6 7 At the turn of the
century, lawsuits were uncommon. 68 That trend was paralleled by
media coverage that either did not report litigation at all or described it as unusual and inappropriate. 69 When, during the industrial revolution, the number of severe industrial accidents began to
skyrocket,7 0 media coverage of litigation changed. Newspapers began publicizing these accidents, and juxtaposed their portrayals of
innocent and horribly injured workers against culpable busi65. See Edith Greene et al., Jurors'AttitudesAbout Civil Litigation and the Size of
DamageAwards, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 805, 812 (1991) (analyzing data supporting contention of jurors being influenced by media).
66. See W. Kip Viscusi, The Challenge of Punitive Damages Mathematics, 30J. LEGAL STUD. 313, 331 (2001) (discussing effect of anchor values on awards).In that
study, one group of participants was told of a "similar case" where $50 million in
punitive damages were awarded, while a second group was told nothing. Ultimately, the group told of the award awarded higher damages than did the censored group.
Other studies, however, suggest media coverage causes jurors to respond negatively, reducing awards to stem the perceived tide of out-of-control damages. See
Valerie P. Hans & William S. Lofquist, Jurors'Judgmentsof Business Liability in Tort
Cases: Implicationsfor the Litigation Exposition Debate, 26 LAW & Soc'v REv. 85, 97
(1992) (notingjuries react to stem perceived rise in damages).
67. Cf Mira Sotirovic, Effects of Media Use on Complexity andExtremity of Attitudes
Toward the Death Penalty and Prisoners'Rehabilitation,3 MEDIAPSYCHOLOGY 1, 4 (2001)
("What we learn about social issues generally comes to us through some type of
media, broadcast or print.").
68. See Illusions, supra note 17, at 328 (stating there was general disfavor of
civil jury). Litigation was inconsistent with the predominant belief systems of
Americans who, accustomed to adversity, accepted whatever fate visited upon
them, and did not look for another party to whom to shift losses. See LAWRENCE M.
FRIEDMAN,

A HISTORY

OF AMERICAN

LAW 185-87 (2d ed. 1985) [hereinafter

HISTORY]

(describing two million injuries yearly); cf. Illusions, supra note 17, at 331 (maintaining societal desires to stimulate economy led to generous treatment of business
corporations), 328 (asserting legal doctrine favored business); Julie Pacquin,
Avengers, Avoiders, and Lumpers: The Incidence of Disputing Style on Litigiousness, 19
WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 3, 30 (2001)

(stating people who hold fatalistic beliefs

may lack motivation to sue).
69. See BUSINESS, supra note 7, at 50-54.

70. See id. at 7 (noting industrial accidents caused about two million injuries
and 35,000 deaths per year around beginning of twentieth century); see also LAWRENCE

M.

FRIEDMAN,

LAW IN AMERICA 43 (2002) [hereinafter LAW] ("Nothing does a

better job of mangling human bodies than machines.").
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nesses. 71 Stories even noted protests against unsafe working conditions. 72 Consequently, the frequency, tone, and content of this
coverage signaled that litigation was just.73 This change in media
coverage helped support, if not develop, new social attitudes favor75
ing litigation,7 4 and soon society began to sue in greater numbers.
This account is not meant to suggest that the media is a singular,
causal factor inspiring litigation, but to acknowledge the media's
influence on people's beliefs and actions regarding litigation.
Hence, while the 1970s may not have marked the beginning of
a statistically-supported litigation explosion, it did commence a wave
of messages about a litigation explosion. 7 6 Stories of novel suits put
the issue of litigation on the public radar. As public interest piqued, the media continued to look for and report stories about litigation. While the accounts may have whetted an appetite, the
increase in the number of stories also suggested to viewers an increase in the amount of litigation, although the suggestion was
largely self-replicating. Business then responded with anecdotes of
runaway juries, high damage awards, and abusive plaintiffs. 77 Since
these anecdotes were consistent with the increase in litigation reports, the media integrated litigation explosion rhetoric into its cov-

71. See BUSINESS, supra note 7, at 7 (noting high visibility of industrial injury
cases brought about legal change); see also Matthew T. Miklave, Why "Jury"Isa Four
Letter Word, 77 WORKFORCE, Mar. 1998, at 57 (claiming publicity generated by media coverage of trials and monetary awards encourages individuals to sue).
72. See BUSINESS, supra note 7, at 8 (observing protests were born out of progressive attitudes about collective responsibilities of business).
73. See HISTORY, supra note 68, at 545 (indicating newspapers sensationalized
high profile trials and accidents in late nineteenth century).
74. Most of that coverage focused on citizens suing business. See Richard H.
McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. Rv. 338,
391-92 (1997) (stating social norms can rise and fall in relatively short time); see
also BUSINESS, supra note 7, at 7-8 (observing twenty-three wrongful death lawsuits
arose from 1911 Triangle Shirtwaist Factory fire); Arthur F. McEvoy, The Triangle
Shirtwaist FactoryFire Of 1911: Social Change, IndustrialAccidents, and the Evolution Of
Common Sense Causality, 20 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 621, 637-38 (1995) (discussing civil
litigation in aftermath of fire).
75. See HISTORY, supra note 68, at 548-49.
76. See BUSINESS, supra note 7, at 70-71 (detailing media reports and business
ads complaining of litigation).
77. See id. at 15, 51-70 (describing business-sponsored "litigation horror stories" and anti-litigation advertising campaigns, as well as businesses crafted advertising campaigns "decrying a litigation explosion"); see also Oil Strike, supra note 12,
at 731 (noting corporate publicity departments disseminated stories of trivial
claims). In fact, as early as 1969, when punitive damage awards were highly unusual, businesses lobbied to scale down or eliminate them. See Rustad, supra note
42, at 10, 17 (claiming punitive damages rare before 1969).
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erage. 78 For example, The NationalLaw Journaldeemed America to

be in the midst of "The Hundred Years' (Tort) War, '79 and other
media labeled Americans "sue-happy."8 0 Media coverage of the "litigation explosion" increased, thereby buttressing claims of the phenomenon by American businesses.
Story selection and content further contributed to the "litigation explosion" mythology: The media overrepresented sensational
tort stories, the plaintiffs who brought suit, and high damage
awards 81 at the expense of typical suits and verdicts. Moreover,
21% of those reports mentioned punitive damages, though they
were awarded in only 4.6% of cases. 82 Even now, the media is
twelve times more likely to report verdicts for plaintiffs than for defendants. 83 The media also publicized the tort reform component,
"Contract With America." 84 Ultimately, this "[t] ort 'reform' propaganda [helped create] the almost palpable belief we live in a
sue'em society, where 'frivolous' lawsuits are commonplace and
''8 5
plaintiff lawyers are no more than hired gunfighters.
78. See BUSINESS, supra note 7, at 50-52 (describing spread of litigation "horror
stories"); Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, "The Impact that it Has Had Between
People's Ears": Tort Reform, Mass Culture, and Plaintiffs' Lawyers, 50 DEPAUL L. REv.
453, 467 (2000) (discussing 1988 Aetna TV and radio campaign and 1986 $6.5
million Insurance Information Institute campaign).
79. Andrew Blum, The Hundred Years' (Tort) War, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 15, 1990, at
1 (describing battle between American Tort Reform Association and Association of
Trial Lawyers of America).
80. Do We Know, supra note 22, at 1157 n.25 (cataloguing stories including:
"[a]cross the country, people are suing one another with abandon; courts are
clogged with litigation; lawyers are burdening the populace with legal bills"); see
also Oil Strike, supra note 12, at 731 (recounting stories of "disembodied cartoonlike tales that pivot on a single bizarre factor").
81. See Lande, supra note 7, at 6-7 (arguing media highlights unusual and
sensational stories). The media overrepresents not only tort litigation but also incidents of violence. See Sarah Eschholz, The Media and Fearof Crime: A Survey of the
Research, 9 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 37, 37-38 (1997) (asserting media overrepresents violent crime). This exaggeration of violence in society is shared by
viewers and readers who also tend to overestimate the amount of violence in society. See id. at 39-51 (reviewing twenty-five studies on television viewing and crime
anxiety).
82. See Oil Strike supra note 12, at 746 (reporting study of newspaper coverage
from 1985 to 1996).
83. See id. at 746 (citing research in newspaper study).
84. Posey, supranote 31, at 125 (noting media attention of tort reform in this
instance); see also Miklave, supranote 71, at 55, 56 (describing litigation explosion).
85. Mandell, supra note 46, at 28 (using this to show jurors sympathize with
plaintiffs); see also Marc S. Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD.
L. REv. 1093, 1154-55 (1996) (stating unfounded stories about out of control juries
and litigation explosion have influenced public opinion); Peck, supra note 32, at
19 ("[T]ort 'reformers' have manufactured myths and anecdotes about supposed
cases to further their political agenda by enraging the public about a civil justice
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E. The Media as Normative Messenger
The media contributes not only to beliefs about litigation but
also to actions to undertake litigation. Many factors influence the
prevalence of lawsuits, including changes in the law, the expansion
or contraction of remedy, 86 procedural barriers, 87 and business cycles. 8 8 As suggested, however, another and more constant factor in
forecasting social propensities toward "disputing" is the media.
The media exercises its influence by publicizing or implying
norms of disputing. Norms are societal expectations of how one is
to act. 89 Norms tell us what others deem right or wrong, 90 much
like a parent frowning when we put our elbows on the table or smilsystem supposedly gone awry. The tales they tell have little relationship to the facts
....
.).
To the extent that litigation has decreased, it may be due to publicity about the
tort reform movement, rather than any tort reforms. See Illusions, supra note 17, at
330-31.
86. See Miklave, supra note 71, at 56-57 (remarking on past decade, Congress
and state legislatures expanded legal protections for employees); see also BUSINESS,
supra note 7, at 6-7 (stating in nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, contributory negligence and fellow servant doctrines typically barred plaintiff recovery);
Legends, supra note 38, at 60 (noting expansion of remedy plus cultural shift expanding notion of rights).
87. For instance, the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure amended Rule 11, and state courts tightened sanctions. See Chris Guthrie,
Framing Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological Theory, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 163, 164
(2000) (arguing reforms were created to remedy problems associated with frivolous lawsuits). Similarly, the Supreme Court has interpreted law to make summary
judgment on behalf of tort defendants more readily available. See Oliver, supra
note 7, at 97 (stating until 1970, legal rules discouraged filing suits, but "[t]his has
changed"). See, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986) (holding
summary judgment can be made with or without affidavits by moving party); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986) (holding only substantive legally relevant facts are analyzed for summary judgment); Matsushita Elec.
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) (emphasizing issue of fact
must be genuine to be adjudicated).
88. Some business models also employ an economic model. Generally, these
models posit that potential litigants make decisions regarding suit and settlement
to maximize, in dollars (via belief in ultimate verdicts), the value of litigation. See
Guthrie, supra note 87, at 170-71 (asserting litigants weigh settlement value with
expected trial value, including costs, in determining when to settle).
89. See McAdams, supra note 74, at 350 ("[C]onsiderable effort has gone into
defining exactly what constitutes a norm" and "economic[s] literature continues to
struggle over the issue[.]") (citations omitted); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Social
Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 903, 914 (1996) (positing norms are
understood in many different ways).
90. SeeJOEL CHARON, THE MEANINGS OF SOCIOLOGY 61-62, 107 (4th ed. 1993)
(suggesting norms signal society's rules or expectations). To illustrate, the litigious actions of Americans in response to torts have been contrasted with the very
opposite reactions of Japanese. See ROBERT KIDDER, CONNECTING LAW & SOCIETY:
AN INTRODUCTION TO RESEARCH & THEORY 46 (1983).
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ing when we give to charity. 9 1 Just as children look to adults9 2 to

understand what is bad and good, 93 so, too, do we look to other
members of society to set the boundaries of appropriate and inappropriate behavior. Normative conformity can reflect avoidance of
abnormal behaviors or compliance with normal ones. For instance,
sometimes we conform out of an internal sense of duty or fear of
negative reputational consequences due to deviance 94 -

we don't

want our mothers to think badly of us. Other times, we conform
out of a desire for social esteem 9 5 - we want our mothers to think
well of us. Regardless of the positive or negative motivation,
norms 96 influence our choices 9 7 and behaviors. 98

91. See CHARON, supra note 90, at 61-62 (noting norms refer to expectations
people have of one another). Norms may refer to behavior such as table manners,
relinquishing a seat on the bus, recycling, wearing a helmet while biking, or wearing clothing in public. See Marilyn Chase, Besides Saving Lives, Wearing a Helmet
When Cycling is Cool, WALL ST.J., Sept. 18, 1995, at Bi (describing change in norms
regarding helmets); see also CHARON, supra note 90, at 62.
92. See CHARON, supra note 90, at 61 (noting people are actors within social
structure and learn expectations or role though directions of others in higher status position).
93. See Sunstein, supra note 89, at 914 (noting differences in definition of
social norms are not important and relying on conventional understandings). According to Sunstein, norms are "social attitudes of approval and disapproval, specifying what ought to be done and what ought not to be done." Id.
94. See id. at 915, 916-17 (discussing how public disapproval enforces and defines norms through perceived reputational consequences).
95. The behavior followed must be deemed worthy and the behavior avoided
deemed bad. See McAdams, supra note 74, at 358 (asserting esteem-based norms
require consensus regarding behaviors). This is referred to as the Esteem Theory
of normative origin. See id. at 355-56 (noting Esteem Theory is thesis asserting
norms arise because people seek esteem from others); see also Robert Ellickson, Of
Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta County, 38 STAN. L. REv.
623, 672-75 (1986) (describing system of informal enforcement of rules in trespass
and property-related disputes among cattle ranchers).
96. No singular, universally-accepted theory of how those norms originate exists. See McAdams, supra note 74, at 391, 352 (describing origin of norms as
"puzzle").
97. See Sunstein, supra note 89, at 939 (discussing how social norms, roles,
meanings affect choice and extent of its effect depend on five factors).
98. See CHARON, supra note 90, at 108 (stating norms are part of culture and
influence, shape, or control individual's actions); see also McAdams, supra note 74,
at 339 (observing influence or explanatory nature of norms extends beyond sociologists, to philosophers and economists).
Norms also influence propensities toward illegal behavior. People are "more
likely to commit crimes when they perceive such criminal activity is widespread."
Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REv. 349,
350 (1997) (noting individuals do not decide to commit crimes in isolation). Individuals may conclude crime is status-enhancing or that little or no stigma attaches
to crime. See id.
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Norms also help define the cultural environment of litigation. 99 Norms socialize us into expectations regarding disputes10 0
°2
signaling what is an injury,10 1 what to do about it,1 and what soci-

ety's reaction to lawsuits and plaintiffs will be. 10 3 In some circumstances, norms disfavoring litigation explain avoidance of
litigation.1 0 4 For instance, even with a viable claim, many people do
not seek legal redress. 10 5 Instead, they shy away from litigation out

of fear or embarrassment, 10 6 considering "litigation [ ] a disagreeable,"10 7 if not demeaning, experience.' 0 8 Similarly, a large portion
of the public thinks most plaintiffs are motivated not by a legitimate
99. See Tom R. Tyler &John M. Darley, Is JusticeJust Us?, 28 HOFSTRA L. REv.
707, 719 (2000) (asserting social values underlie social behavior); see also Dan
Coates & Steven Penrod, Social Psychology and the Emergence of Disputes, 15 LAw &
Soc'v REV. 655, 666-67 (1980-81) (claiming social comparisons influence "naming
and blaming" stages of legal disputing).
100. See CHARON, supraat note 90, at 167 (noting importance of socialization
in following society's rules of law); see also Amitai Etzioni, Social Norms: Internalization, Persuasion, and History, 34 LAw & Soc'y REv. 157, 159 (2000) ("Strong social
norms reduce the burden on law enforcement; that laws supported by social norms
are likely to be significantly more enforceable; and that laws that are formulated in
ways that are congruent with social norms are much more likely to be enacted than
laws that offend such norms."). Recently, legal scholars have rediscovered social
norms as a critical factor in law-related behaviors. See id. at 157-58.
101. But see Do We Know, supra note 22, at 1188-89 (suggesting reasons for low
rate of claims by injured individuals). Many victims do not realize that they have
viable legal claims, and, therefore, do not sue. See id.
102. See Daniels & Martin, supra note 78, at 482-85 (noting attempts by lawyers
to adapt to diminishing verdicts in personal injury cases).
103. See Rohrlich, supra note 42, at Al (noting litigation-oriented decisions
made with reference to social norms of suit and plaintiffs). Some experts assert
increases and decreases in legal filing reflect cultural changes regarding the perception of suits and plaintiffs. See id.
104. See id. (identifying how norms disfavor litigation). Few wrongs mature
into lawsuits, and on the journey from harm to the courthouse, any number of
factors can deter an individual from litigation: (1) no realization of a legal claim;
(2) insufficient funds to pursue a claim; (3) counsel (or others) labeling the claim
unworthy; and/or (4) the stigma associated with suit. See id. For a grievance to
mature into a legal dispute, the victim must perceive a wrong as qualifying for
redress, seek legal help, and conclude the appropriate action under the circumstances is to sue. See Do We Know, supra note 22, at 1188 (suggesting reasons for
low rate of injury claims by victims). Nonetheless, not all aggrieved engage in
"naming," that is, perceive a legally-cognizable injury, transform it into a grievance,
and request a remedy. Id.
105. See Rohrlich, supra note 42, at Al (explaining decline in tort litigation).
Even when they do identify cognizable legal claims, people are inclined to give up
rather than fight. See id.
106. See Do We Know, supra note 22, at 1189 (telling potential plaintiffs factor
in stigma associated with litigation and decline suit).
107. Pacquin, supra note 68, at 17 (classifying attitudes of users and non-users
to court systems).
108. See id. (claiming many people think of litigation as "disagreeable
experience").
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grievance, but by greed. 10 9 Psychological research has even shown
jurors often blame and denigrate plaintiffs victimized by business

wrongdoing. 110 These publicized" 1 views communicate a norm disparaging litigation and those who consider it.112 Thus, as putative
3
plaintiffs attempt to avoid the stigma of litigation and litigants,"

114
they are deterred from bringing lawsuits.
By contrast, when society deems litigation as "normal," or at
least not abnormal,' 1 5 the stigma of litigious behavior is eliminated
along with the threat to one's social esteem. Consequently, individuals will be more inclined to litigate either because there are no
negative reputational consequences, that would otherwise deter
suit, to avoid, or simply because there exists a norm encouraging
litigation. 116 In these ways, norms not only influence litigious behaviors, 1 7 but also regulate access to the legal system. And it is the
media that publicizes these norms.

F.

The Primacy of Television

Though all media can exert some degree of normative force,
television boasts both a unique character and force as a normative
messenger.1' 8 For norms to emerge and influence attitudes or be109. See Daniels & Martin, supra note 78, at 454 (detailing beliefs of people
regarding civil litigation).
110. See Illusions, supra note 17, at 334-35 (describing jury's perception to
plaintiffs injured by business corporations).
111. See Lande, supra note 7, at 3 (describing public images of litigation).
"The public image of litigation as reflected in the mass media is largely a negative
one." Id.
112. Shame also influences norm formation. See Toni M. Massaro, The Meanings of Shame: Implications for Legal Reform, 3 PSYCH. PUB. POL'Y & L. 645, 649-50

(1997) (explaining humans enjoy exploiting other people's vulnerability through
public humiliation).
113. See Sauer, supra note 8, at H-1 (stating injured people with valid claims
avoid court to avoid reputation as "the kind who goes to court").
114. See id. (noting citizens avoid suit to avoid shame associated with suing).
Some believe business has portrayed litigation as shameful. See Rohrlich, supra
note 42, at A17 ("Corporations have created a stigma for people [who sue].")
(quoting Jamie Court, Director of Foundation for Taxpayer and Consumer
Rights).
115. See Massaro, supra note 112, at 651 (noting differing views on "shameful
failures").
116. Under such circumstances, litigation can be esteem-enhancing. See
Kahan, supra note 98, at 350 (exploring roles of social influence and social
meaning).
117. See Sunstein, supra note 89, at 907 (noting "[b]ehavior is pervasively a
function of norms").
118. SeeAlthaus & Tewksbury, supra note 51, at 181 (asserting television dominant mechanism for disseminating information); see also Edward Sankowski, Film,
Crime, and States Legitimacy: Political Education or Mis-Education?, 36 J. AESTHETIC

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2004

19

20

Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [2004], Art. 1
& ENT. LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 11: p. I

VILLANOVA SPORTS

haviors, first, there must be an apparent consensus about a behavior and, second, that consensus must be publicized.1 1 9 People
consider behaviors correct to the degree they see others perform
them. Absent such publicity, individuals lack a known standard
against which to judge their acts. 120 For instance, a behavior may
be popular statistically, but, if the social group is unaware of the
numerical consensus, it will not materialize into a normative force
influencing behavior. Instead, pursuing or avoiding such behavior
will be independent of any normative influence. 121 Television thus
wields much of its normative force by publicizing these "social
proofs."' 1 22 Television's images show us' 23 how things work and

what to do. 12 4 Because virtually every American owns a television
set, 125 and most watch with ritualized regularity, 126 a huge audi1, 1 (2002) (describing film and related media as important sources of visually centered media); Carol P. Getty, Corrections - Media Wise?, 63 CORRECTIONS
TODAY 126, 127-28 (2001) (observing media both shapes and transmits norms).
119. See McAdams, supra note 74, at 362-65 (reporting esteem-based norms
require publicized consensus).
120. See id. at 400 (recognizing publicity barrier). The publicity condition is
difficult to satisfy and is often "[t]he determinative obstacle to societal norm formation." Id.
121. See id. at 362 (explaining ignorance of consensus will not produce
norm).
122. See id. 362-64 (discussing importance of consensus). Furthermore, the
actor's behavior not only establishes a behavioral consensus, but also incites the
reaction of others to the behavior, which reinforces the behavior's acceptability or
normalcy. See, e.g., ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PERSUASION (1993). Those reactions "'pro[ve]' that the behavior is appropriate." Id.
123. Moreover, the influence of these images is enhanced by television's auditory and visual stimuli. See Gary R. Edgerton & Michael T. Marsden, The TeacherScholar in Film and Television, J. POPULAR FILM & TELEVISION 2, 3 (2002) (noting in
past century, priorities shifted away from printed word and toward image). Print
media describes, but it cannot add moving pictures, speech, tone, lighting, camera
angles, music, and interspersion of shots. Television news includes pictures with its
narrative, but its narratives are a metered vocal tone, accompanied by stolid sets
and largely static images. It is the difference between reading a screenplay and
seeing the completed, scored movie.
124. SeeJonathan Cohen & Gabriel Weimann, Cultivation Revisited: Some Genres
Have Some Effects on Some Viewers, 13 COMM. REPS. 99, 101 (2000).
125. See Todd Picus, Demystifying the Least Understood Branch: Opening the Supreme Court to BroadcastMedia, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1053, 1085 n.172 (1993) (discussing
Broadcast Ban on Supreme Court proceedings and how 98% of Americans have at
least one television) (citation omitted).
126. See id. Since 1983, the average household has tuned in seven hours per
day. See id. at 1085. The average adult watches over four hours of television each
day, and his or her children will watch even more. See Edgerton, supra note 123, at
3; see also L.J. Shrum, Effects of Television Portrayalsof Crime and Violence on Viewers'
Perceptions of Reality: A Psychological Process Perspective, 22 LEGAL STUD. F. 257, 257
(1998) (reporting more than four hours per day for individuals and seven hours
per day for households). Adults over fifty-five years of age watch the most televiEDU.
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ence 12 7 is privy to the behaviors and opinions of others 128 - at
least as seen on TV.
Researchers have long asserted that television influences perceptions of reality. 129 Individuals learn from what they see on television, 130 and, even if they forget the specific elements, retain
general impressions that can influence their perceptions of the
world.1 3 1 "In turn, these perceptions of reality, regardless of their
accuracy, are consequential for individuals' judgments and decisions."'13 2 In fact, significant exposure to television can lead to perceptions of reality that differ from those held by non-viewers. 133
Cultivation theory1 3 4 investigates this relationship between television exposure13 5 and particular beliefs about the world, 13 6 specifically, beliefs consistent with media imagery.' 3 7 According to
sion, approximately five and a half hours daily. See Edgerton, supra note 123, at 4
(noting American public watches television with ritualized regularity).
127. See Angelique M. Paul, Note, Turning the Camera on Court 7V.: Does Televising Trials Teach Us Anything About the Real Law?, 58 OHIO CT. L.J. 655, 656 (1997)
(stating Americans get majority of information from television); see also Brian
Lowry, In the King Trial We Wake, News Media Will Be the Message, DAILY VARIETy, Apr.
7, 1993, at 1 (noting size of television viewing audience).
128. See Kahan, supra note 98, at 351 (averring people draw inferences from
behavior of others).
129. See Sotirovic, supra note 51, at 750 (stating television influences viewer's
perception of reality).
130. Cf Paul, supra note 127, at 656 (noting Americans' perspective on legal
system obtained from television).
131. See id. This hearkens to cultivation's "mainstreaming" process, where
viewers learn facts about the world and are socialized by observing them on the
television screen. See Cohen & Weimann, supra note 124, at 102 (describing how
media content shapes our attitudes).
132. Sotirovic, supra note 51.
133. See Cohen & Weimann, supra note 124, at 108 (exemplifying how certain
television genres are significantly related to certain cultivation measures). George
Gerbner, the architect of cultivation theory, contends television does not merely
reflect beliefs, but cumulative exposure develops a set of beliefs in viewers. See
George Gerbner, Growing Up With Television: The Cultivation Perspective, in MEDIA
ErFcrs: ADVANCES IN THEORY AND RESEARCH 43, 51 (Jennings Bryant & Dolf
Zillman eds. 2002).
134. See Edgerton & Marsden, supra note 123, at 4 (describing cultivation effect). Although cultivation began as a more limited concept, its emphasis shifted
"from individual short-term effects to the long-term cultural-ideological socialization role of repetitive messages found in television programming." John L. Sherry,
Media Saturation and Entertainment-Education,12 COMm. THEORY 206, 211 (2002).
135. See Cohen & Weimann, supra note 124, at 112 (maintaining cultivation
accounts for effects of dominant messages on television).
136. See SHANAHAN & MORGAN, supranote 1, at 73 (describing impact of main-

streaming as overriding behavior ordinarily stemming from other factors).
137. See Thomas C. O'Guinn & L.J. Shrum, The Role of Television in the Construction of Consumer Reality, 23 J. CONSUMER RES. 278, 280 (1996) (highlighting
studies analyzing association between television exposure and perceptions of
affluence).
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cultivation theory, the more an audience sees a behavior on televi-

sion, the more it believes those behaviors are normal and, therefore, acceptable.13 8 Hence, the more people watch television, the
more they will "cultivate" the television image, believing the real
world resembles what they see on television. The world as seen on
TV, however, may bear little resemblance to reality139 and cultivate
140
a distorted view of the world.
G.

Law as Seen on TV

Scholars have begun to recognize a similar interaction between
television and perceptions of the law. 141 Television brings the legal
process into our living rooms, 14 2 both demystifying and defining
it.143 Yet, television is not always an accurate window into the court138. This is a two-step process. First, during the "learning phase," viewers acquire from television portrayals many pieces of incidental information. SHANAHAN
& MORGAN, supra note 1, at 72-74 (describing process of cultivation theory). Next,
during the "construction phase," these separate pieces of information congeal to
inform the viewer's beliefs. Id.
139. See Shrum, supra note 126, at 258 ("The rate of portrayal of crime and
violence on television programs is roughly ten times greater than its real world
incidence.").
140. See Gerbner, supra note 133, at 51-58.
141. See Paul R. Joseph & Gayle Mertez, Law and Pop Culture: Teaching and
Learning About Law Using Images From PopularCulture, 64 Soc. EDUC. 206 (2000)
(suggesting pop culture "help[s] shape the public's view of law"); see also Lawrence
M. Friedman, Lexitainment: Legal Process as Theatre, 50 DEPAUL L. REv. 539, 540
(2000) (claiming legal entertainment can be didactic).
142. See Getty, supra note 118, at 126 (proposing television influences how
Americans view justice); see alsoJoseph & Mertez, supra note 141, at 206 (announcing that for many, "primary source of knowledge about.., the legal system" comes
from television); Leah Ward Sears, Those Low-Brow TV Court Shows, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, July 10, 2001, at 11 (declaring Americans get lasting impression of
courts from television).
In 1999, the American Bar Association commissioned a report to discover how
citizens learned about the law. The resulting Report on Perceptions of the U.S. Justice
System concluded, "the media can and does impact some people's knowledge"
about the justice system. American Bar Association Report on Perceptions of the U.S.
Justice System, 62 ALB. L. REv. 1307, 1315 (1999) (stating all forms of media have
greater impact on knowledge base of people with less knowledge than those with
more knowledge).
143. See Asimow, supra, note 4, at 552 (positing law on television "create[s]
knowledge and reality"); see also David Ray Papke, Essay, Conventional Wisdom: The
Courtroom Trial in American PopularCulture, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 471, 488 (1999) (recognizing television's courtroom "reinforces, shapes, and directs" public's view of
courts).
Of course, those television representations may be distorted. See Birke & Fox,
supra note 43, at 9; Eschholz, supra note 81, at 37-39 (noting television exaggerates
incidence of violent crime); see also Bruce M. Selya, The Confidence Games: Public
Perceptionsof the Judiciary, 30 NEW ENG.L. REv. 909, 913-14 (1996) (proposing media's coverage of judicial decisions tends toward sensationalism and "implant[s]
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room. 1 44 Rather, its lens alters the reality of and shapes perceptions

about the law.' 45 Moreover, the impact of television representations is heightened because these representations are the only ex146
periences a majority of Americans have with the legal system.
In the last decade, a new form of law has burst onto the television screen: the syndicated television courtroom or "syndi-court."
Deemed the "hottest trend in daytime television,"' 47 shows like
Judge Judy and The People's Court are the new messengers of law.
Though easy to discount as fluff, 1 4 8 the communicative power of
this genre 149 is tremendous. 15 0 As demonstrated by its ratings,
syndi-court boasts a regular audience of approximately 8,500,000
viewers. 1 5 ' Its closest competitor, Court TV, on a good day, manages
within the public psyche a potential for undue cynicism and the basis for rejecting
judicial authority").
144. See, e.g., Podlas, supra note 4, at 15-21, 24 (commenting on how syndicourt television programs create misperception and inaccurate portrayal of actual
courtroom); see also Harris, supra note 5, at 786, 798; Austin Sarat, Exploring the
Hidden Domains of CivilJustice: "Naming,Blaming and Claiming" in Popular Culture,
50 DEPAUL L. REV. 425, 450 (2000) (stating law lives in media images that saturate
our culture);; Kelly L. Cripe, Comment, Empowering the Audience: Television's Role in
the DiminishingRespect for the AmericanJudicialSystem, 6 UCLA ENT. L. REv. 235, 24546 (1999) (televising criminal trials provides audience with great deal of
information).
145. See Edwin Yoder, Television in Courtroom Reshapes the Reality It Covers, ST.
Louis POST-DISPATCH, Sept. 30, 1994, at 13D (explaining how lens of TV "shapes
and alters as it mediates").
146. See Elliot E. Slotnik, Television News and the Supreme Court: A Case Study, 77
JUDICATURE 21, 22 (1993) (articulating television provides majority of public with
its only information about law); see also Joseph & Mertez, supra note 141, at 206
(discussing how primary knowledge about law comes from pop culture sources,
including television, which shapes public's view of law); Selya, supra note 143, at
913 (1996) ("[F]ew individuals have direct experience with the justice system.")
(citations omitted).
147. Jurkowitz, supra note 6, at 96 ("Syndicated courtroom shows are increasing in popularity.").
148. See Naomi R. Rockier, It'sJust Entertainment,J. POPULAR FILM & TELEVISION 16, 17 (2002) (explaining media educators regularly encounter criticisms that
television is merely entertainment, and, therefore, illegitimate for critical analysis
or scholarly study). But see NEIL POSTMAN, AMUSING OURSELVES TO DEATH 16
(1985) ("The best things on television are its junk.").
149. See SHANArAN & MORGAN, supra note 1, at ix-x. Whereas previous mass
communication research considered whether individual messages could produce
changes in audience attitudes or behaviors, cultivation looks at the totality of television or a genre. See id.
150. See Mike Saewitz, Many Judge U.S. Justice System by the TV Courtroom Shows,
VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Oct. 3, 2001, at E. Even New York's chief judge concurred that

watching Judge Judy "play[s] a huge role in public perceptions of the justice system." Kaye, supra note 3, at 1491 (recalling her speech to American Bar
Association).
151. In 1997, Judge Judy was the number-one ranked syndicated show, even
topping Oprah. See Marc Gunther, The LittleJudge Who Kicked Oprah's Butt: Daytime
Television's Hottest Property, FORTUNE, May 1999, at 32 (discussing rise of JudgeJudy
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only an anemic 6% of that audience 15 2 - and can do so only by
15 3
replacing its legal coverage with movies and NYPD Blue repeats.
Additionally, syndi-court's "little morality plays"' 5 4 ensure a
memorable experience, 155 and, therefore an even greater impact.
For instance, their "structural features," such as edits, cuts, and music, help increase viewer attention, and, thus, memory. 156 The camera never lingers on one party, but constantly moves between the
and influx of other reality courtroom shows it has spawned); see alsoJoe Schlosser,
Another Benchmark for judge Judy,'BROADCASTING & CABLE, Mar. 29, 1999, at 15 (reporting on Judy Sheindlih's new contract will have her sharing in profits of Judge
Judy); Gary Levin, Judge Judy OverrulesDaytime Chat, USA TODAY, Mar. 25, 1999, at
3D.
These shows remain popular. The week ofJanuary 21-27, 2002, JudgeJudy had
8.4 million viewers and JudgeJoe Brown had 4.4 million viewers. See Lynette Rice &
Dan Snierson, On the Air; The Latest News from the TV Beat, 640-41 ENT. WKLY., Feb.
22, 2002, at 133 (listing viewership for thirty most-watched syndicated programs);
see also Bill Keveny, Syndicated Goldies Are Oldies: New Shows Are No Match, USA ToDAY, Nov. 26, 2001, at 4D (stating JudgeJudy garners 7,061,000 viewers and remains
among top ten syndicated shows); cf Walt Belcher, Judge Judy Continues Her Rule as
the Queen of All Court Shows, TAMPA TRIB., Mar. 7, 2002, at 4 (detailing how court
show ratings dipped after September l1th while ratings for sitcom reruns
increased).
152. Harris, supra note 5, at 803 ("Court TVs regular fare stands out because
of its tediousness. It has all the pizzazz of a pair of orthopedic shoes.").
Court TV recently garnered its highest ratings ever - 557,000 viewers for the
first quarter of 2002. See Court TV Has Highest Quarterly Rating in Network's History,
Bus. WINE, Apr. 2, 2002, at 1 [hereinafter Court TV]. This ratings increase was
driven by the premier of Forensic Files and the movie, Guilt By Association, as well as
growth in the networks distribution. Id. (announcing Court TVs surge in ratings).
153. See Court TV, supra note 152, at I (stating how Court TVhas not lived up
to promise and has recently increased ratings by airing repeats of A'YPD Blue, as
opposed to airing more or better legal coverage).
154. J. Max Robins, Senior Editor, TV GUIDE, Feb. 2001.
155. See Itzhak Yanovitzky, Effects of News Coverage on Policy Attention and Actions,
29 COMM. RES. 422, at 424 (2002) (arguing since "media effects are contingent on
a person's motivation to attend to the message ....Motivation, in turn, is [partly]
a function of ... message attributes").

156. These features elicit an "orienting response" that directs the viewer's attention to particular information presented. See Annie Lang et al., The Effects of
Edits on Arousal, Attention, and Memory for Television Messages: When an Edit is an Edit
Can an Edit Be Too Much? 44J. BROADCASTING & ELECTRONIC MEDIA 94, 96 (2000)
(examining effect of rate of camera changes in same visual scene on viewers'
arousal, attention, and memory).
The availability heuristic further enhances the influence of these comparisons. "People infer the prevalence of something from the ease with which an ex-

ample can be recalled." Shrum, supra note 126, at 262 (explaining use of cognitive
heuristics). Of course, the more popular something seems, the easier it is to remember. See id. Thus, with syndi-court's Nielsen popularity and imagery, frequent
litigation and numerous pro se litigants are easy to recall. Unfortunately, research
indicates people are often unaware of the source of their information and unable
or unwilling to determine the source of their memories. See id. at 264. Therefore,
it is unlikely that people will first reflect and then discount information, because it
was gleaned from syndi-court.
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litigant narratives and the judge's reaction.15 7 Studies have demonstrated increasing the number of edits in a television "message" increases viewers' attention, as well as their ability to remember the
message.' 5 8 Syndi-court also makes use of drama, 159 labeling the
disputes, focusing on judge reactions, 160 and adding a musical
score. These features also increase the "active participation and involvement of the audience." 61 By contrast, as one bored television
critic said, syndi-court's closest cousin, Court TV, "stands out because of its tediousness,"1 62 and is about as exciting as "a pair of
163
orthopedic shoes."'
Finally, unlike legal reporting or Court TV, syndi-court shows
cumulatively share a homogenous format, presenting a unified
body of information and reinforcing the images and lessons of each
other. Televised trials, by contrast, are generally too infrequent,
long, and unique 16 4 to educate the public. 165 Even when a viewer
can devote the time to watch a television trial from start to finish,
157. See Stacy Davis, The Effects of Audience Reaction Shots on Attitudes Towards

ControversialIssues, 43J. BROADCASTING & ELECTRONIC MEDIA 476, 477 (1999). Reaction shots, such as those common of the syndi-court bench, are among the "most
commonly used editing devices used to capture and manipulate" participants'
emotions. Id. (describing broad use of reaction shots in film and television).
Facial expressions, in particular, communicate a number of messages. See id.
at 476. Research demonstrates shots of facial expressions can influence viewer perceptions of the speaker's reaction to or opinions about the topics discussed. See id.
at 477.
158. See Lang, supra note 156, at 105 (providing evidence for "limited capacity
approach" to television viewing). Furthermore, the presentation of cases is simple
and dichotomous and the resolution of disputes swift. See Lisa Scottoline, Law and
PopularCulture: Get Off the Screen: Address at the Nova Southeastern University's Goodwin
Alumni Banquet (Mar. 1999), 24 NovA L. REV. 655, 657 (2000) (commenting on

people's fascination with shows such as JudgeJudy and The People's Court).
159. The six key elements of drama are: action or plot, character, thought or
ideas, verbal expression or language, music or song, and spectacle. See JEFFREY
HATCHER, THE ART AND CRAFT OF PLAYWRITING 21 (1996) (highlighting six essential

ingredients for writing successful drama).
160. See Podlas, supra note 4, at 18-20 (discussing study showing how jurors
interpret judge reactions and use them to guide evidentiary determinations).
161. D. Lawrence Kincaid, Drama, Emotion, and Cultural Convergence, 2 COMM.
THEORY 136, 138 (2002) (describing how successful drama results in audience
identifying with characters). An engaging story with emotional elements will further heighten the impact on the audience. See id.
162. Harris, supra note 5, at 803 (stating Court TVis only considered boring in
light of more modern such as those on MTV channel).
163. Id. (referencing MTV era as responsible for making shows, such as Court
TV, seem mundane).
164. See Cripe, supra note 144, at 237 (telling how high-profile cases receive
majority of media's attention).
165. See Lassiter, supra note 5, at 934-35 (claiming television trials could be
educational if it was not so easily abused to further politics).
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those trials tend to fixate on sensational lures or peculiar elements
66
rather than the legal process.'
III.

EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF SYNDI-COURT

The ubiquity of syndi-court coupled with the power of televi-

sion as normative messenger may contribute to the public's opinions about litigation. It is, therefore, important to understand what
signals syndi-court sends, what it tells us about litigation, and what
potential influence on attitudes and behaviors it may exact.

A set of triangulated studies contemplated this potential influence. These studies, a content analysis and surveys of prospective
juror and juror-eligible adults investigated:
(1) What themes syndi-court promotes
(2) Whether those themes promote or discourage
litigation

(3) Whether syndi-court influences or interacts with
viewer belief systems pertaining to
a. Undertaking litigation
b. Undertaking pro se representation
(4) Whether syndi-court influences viewer action with regard to
a. Undertaking litigation
b. Undertaking pro se representation
A.

Content Analysis of Syndi-Court Messages

1. Protocol
To accurately assess what occurs on syndi-court, one must first
employ some sort of scientific protocol. Here, the method chosen
was the content analysis, a protocol borrowed from the field of communication theory. 167 Thus, the content of four syndi-courts was
systematically monitored for two two-week periods in September
and November of 2002, totaling four weeks or twenty hours. Shows
were chosen based on Nielsen ratings, 168 hence, the four highest
166. See id. at 973 (observing trials tend to fixate on sensational lures, not less
sexy legal issues).
167. Cultivation analysis begins with a message system analysis. This analysis
identifies the most recurrent, overarching content. See Gerbner, supra note 133, at
43, 49 (describing technique used to identify recurrent, subtle messages received
by viewers).
168. Nielsen Media Research estimates that as many as thirty-one million people see at least one TVjudge daily. SeeJurkowitz, supra note 6 (referring to thirtyone million viewers who tune in to Moral Court, Divorce Court, or JudgeJudy).
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rated shows were chosen: Judge Judy, Judge Joe Brown, The People's
Court, and Judge Mathis. This yielded a total of 333 segments. 169
Next, coders individually viewed and coded the content of
shows. One group of coders, "Law Coders," consisted of six individuals practicing law; the other group of coders, "Student Coders,"
consisted of eighteen students in a Contemporary Issues course.
Each show was coded by one Law Coder and one Student Coder,
and catalogued according to:
17 0
" plaintiffs per show

* remedy sought

" type of case
Cataloguing between the Student Coders and Law Coders was then
compared. Because the key was to discern the messages the audience would take away from syndi-court, rather than technical legal
accuracy, syndi-court episodes that were coded differently (18 episodes or 5%)171 by the Law Coders than by the Student Coders

were excluded from the final tally.
2.

Results

Table I reports the data for the remaining 315 coded
segments.

169. The segments consisted of portions of, or distinct cases on, a syndi-court
broadcast.
170. This was later calculated to determine the average number of plaintiffs
per week.
171. Four episodes from JudgeJudy, seven from JudgeJoe Brown, five from Judge
Mathis, and two from The People's Court were excluded.
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TABLE I.
Mean

Judge

Joe

Judge

People's

Judy

Brown

Mathis

Court

PLAINTIFFS

73

76

79

87

78.75

TYPE OF CASE
Contract

13

15

20

37

21.25

5

Personal injury

20

19

17

18

18.5

4.6

Property damage

18

22

26

26

23

5.75

Family

22

20

16

6

16

4

REMEDY SOUGHT

Mean

172

17 3

Per Week

19.7174

17 5

< $100

2

15

8

11

9

$100-499

45

35

42

48

42.5

10.6

$500-1,500

17.5

4.4

19

14

18

19

> $1,500

7

12

11

9

Return of property1 7 6

6

8

3

Apology 1 7 7

7

12

21

2.25

9.75

2.4

9

6.5

1.6

22

15.5

3.9

3.

Discussion

a.

The Behaviors That Syndi-Court Publicizes

The content analysis shows syndi-court is not reserved for
weighty remedies or high dollar amounts, but for relatively low dollar amounts. As shown in Table I, the modal dollar remedy sought
is in the $100 to $499 range. Very few litigants appearing on the
episodes sought more than $1,500.
b.

Viewer Translation of Content

The above portrays the raw content of syndi-court, but it is also
critical to determine how the viewing public translates this content.
This constant parade of litigants, of pro se plaintiffs, and of commonly trivial causes of action may signal that both litigation and pro
se representation are common, viable, and normal. Furthermore,
172. This number reflects the mean of the analyzed episodes. The mean for
the full sample of syndi-court plaintiffs equals 83.25 (calculating number of
plaintiffs per week after filtering in coding process equals 78.75, with raw number
of plaintiffs per year equaling 1,092).
173. The per week mean of the total sample equals 21. Thus, a viewer of one
show would see approximately 1,092 plaintiffs per year.
174. This number would amount to approximately 1,024 plaintiffs per year.
175. This section looks at only damages sought, not damages awarded.
176. The plaintiff sought the return of property in addition to monetary
damages or as an alternative to monetary damages.
177. During the presentation of her case, the plaintiff requested an apology
or explained their motivation for suit was to obtain an apology.
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as viewers compare their own legal problems to the more trivial
ones on television, they might conclude, if those grievances warrant
litigation, so do their own. Finally, syndi-court's "little-guy" litigants
championing their own causes may also encourage other litigants,
who would otherwise employ counsel, to go it alone, and enhance
an already-existing tendency toward pro se representation in
others.
Accordingly, having established an empirically-supported content base, the next phase of study investigated connections between
syndi-court viewing, beliefs about, and potential litigious actions.
To ascertain any connections, two studies were undertaken. The
first and most significant in terms of population size and representativeness, sampled prospective jurors. The second study sampled
jury-eligible, college-enrolled adults.
178
B. Juror Study

1. Protocol
The study consisted of distributing a three-page instrument to
241 prospective jurors from Manhattan, the District of Columbia,
and Hackensack, NewJersey awaiting jury service. Prior to entering
the courthouse (and, in some instances, during breaks), individuals
were approached, identified as appearing for jury duty, and asked
to complete a questionnaire. 1 79 No individual that was believed to
be a juror was excluded.
The questionnaire asked respondents to answer a number of
forced-choice questions including syndi-court viewing habits, likelihood of considering pro se litigation, likelihood of considering litigation, and opinions regarding judicial behavior. In exchange for
their participation, jurors received candy bars and the pens used to
complete the questionnaires. Individuals or questionnaires demonstrating obvious English language barriers and those that were substantially incomplete were discarded. Of the 241 surveys
collected, 8 0 225 (93.3%) were analyzed.
178. See Podlas, supra note 4, at 12-15 (depicting juror viewing data and
impact of syndi-court representations on juror opinions about judge behavior).
For a discussion of the Juror Study, see infra notes 178-84 and accompanying text.
179. A similar survey method was used in Harry Kalven and Hans Zeisel's pioneering study. See HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANs ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 33-44
(1971). Kalven and Zeisel, however, questioned judges, notjurors. See id. at 129-

30.
180. 58% of the respondents (n= 130) were women and 42% (n= 95) were
men. See Podlas, supra note 4, at 9-10.
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To isolate any connection between syndi-court viewing and certain factors contemplated by the questionnaire, respondents were
first identified as either frequent viewers ("FV") or non-viewers
("NV'). 18 1 FV watched syndi-court between "two to three times" or
"more than five times per week" (and checked the corresponding
category in the descriptive Likert scale). NV did not watch syndicourt or did so once per week (and checked the appropriate response on the corresponding descriptive scale). 182 Of the 225 juror
responses analyzed, 149 (66.2%) were FV and 76 (33.78%) were
NV.
b.

Litigious Attitudes, Pro Se Representation

Table II contains the means and standard deviations for the
litigiousness and pro se responses for each category of viewer, i.e.,
FV and NV. There was a statistically significant difference (P < .05)
between FV and NV scores on both considering/bringing a claim
(litigiousness) and considering/appearing pro se. In each instance, a higher proportion of FV expressed positive responses than
did NV.

181. See Podlas, supra note 4, at 11 (explaining designations as frequent or
non-frequent viewers to discern if viewership was associated with certain factors in
questionnaire). Quantifying exposure to the medium is a precursor to ascertaining any effect of media. SeeYanovitzky, supranote 155, at 424 (describing results of
study on patterns of media use by members of Congress).
182. This designation mimics Gerbner's "heavy" and "light" viewer labels. See
Gerbner, supra note 133, at 49-50 (describing labels used when referring to
amount of time viewers spend watching television on "average day").
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TABLE II.

Sample

Would consider
bringing claim

Would bring a
claim

Would consider
183
pro se

Would appear
18 4
pro se

Mean
Std. Dev.

Mean
Std. Dev.

Mean
Std. Dev.

Mean
Std. Dev.

FV=149

NV=79

T value

c.

.86

.75

.55

.59

.35

.44

.50

.49

.76

.50

.16

.18

.43

.50

.37

.39

1.77*

3.65**

6.65***

6.76***

Opinions Regarding Judicial Behavior

The Juror Study also considered whether FV held beliefs consistent with syndi-court imagery, specifically, regarding particular judicial behaviors. The data in Table III again indicates statistically
significant differences between viewer groups (P < .0005). Mimicking the pattern of data of litigiousness and pro se leanings, FV
tended to express beliefs about judges mirroring those seen on the
television screen, regardless of whether these beliefs were congistent with reality. Some NV also shared some of these views, but at a
much lower level.
TABLE

III.

VIEWS CONSISTENT WITH SYNDI-COURT IMAGERY

Judges should have
opinion regarding verdict

Judges should ask
questions during trial

Judges should "be
aggressive with litigants
or express displeasure
with their testimony"

FV

75%***

82.5%***

63.76%***

NV

48.6%

38.16%

26.32%

183. The question read:
I
would consider representing myself in court without the aid of an
attorney
__

would NOT consider representing myself in court without the aid of
an attorney
__

184. If I was unable to afford an attorney, I
__
__

would appear in court without the aid of an attorney
would NOT appear in court without the aid of an attorney
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85

1. Eligibles #1
a.

Protocol

A subsequent study186 investigated whether the attitudes and
propensities toward pro se representation were mediated by degree
of risk/jeopardy. The study's first phase consisted of distributing a
one-page instrument to 88 jury-eligible adults who had either completed or were presently enrolled in an introductory-level business
course. Questions pertained to syndi-court viewing habits and propensity toward self-representation in various civil and criminal
contexts.

187

Of the 88 questionnaires completed,18 8 2 (2.27%) were discarded as internally inconsistent. The 86 remaining respondents
were again divided into two groups: FV or NV (as defined by the
Juror Study). Because of the more inclusive question pertaining to
watching "law" television shows, 22 respondents who watched only
legal dramas were excluded from the analysis (25%). Of the remaining 64 questionnaires analyzed, 45 (70.3%) were FV and 19
(29.69%) were NV.
Next, responses to individually-descriptive questions were
translated into "high risk" and "low risk" categories. These contexts
were then translated into "high risk" and "low risk" categories.
Risk/jeopardy was defined in Table IV below:
TABLE IV.

Civil
Criminal

CATEGORIES OF RiSK/JEOPARDY

Low:

$0-$1,500

High:

>$1,500

Low:

Fines up to $1,500
Probation
Up to 3 days in jail
Fines above $1,500
Weeks, months in jail
_>1yr. imprisonment

High:

185. For a discussion of Eligibles #1, see infra notes 185-92 and accompanying
text and tables. For a discussion of Eligibles #2, see infra notes 193-94 and
accompanying text and tables.
186. The Eligibles Studies were conducted in two phases.
187. As the initial Eligibles Study was previously conceived of as independent
of the Juror Study, the questions differ somewhat. Additionally, the initial Eligibles
#1 Survey Instrument collected information regarding viewing of legal dramas.
188. It is unknown how many students were approached but declined participation in the survey.
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Results

Analysis of the Eligibles data yielded statistically significant
findings in expressed propensity toward pro se representation,
once risk/jeopardy was contemplated. The means and standard deviations are shown in Table V below.
TABLE

V.

EXPRESSED PROPENSITY FOR SELF-REPRESENTATION

(ELIGIBLES #1)

Level of Risk/leopardy

Civil low

FV (n=45)
Mean
Std. Dev.
.62

NV (n=19)
Mean
Std. Dev.
.26

.49

.452189

Criminal low

.64
.484

.32

Civil high

.20

.405
Criminal high

1

2.

.022

.149

.478190
.105
.31519'
.05

.229192

Eligibles #2: Extension Study

a. Protocol
In light of the statistically significant results but small sample
the Eligibles protocol was refined and extended for two additional semesters. During this second phase, a new instrument was
constructed that included all queries from the Juror questionnaire
as well as the relevant queries on the initial Student questionnaire,
size, 193

i.e., questions pertaining to pro se representation. Over two semes-

ters, this refined instrument was distributed to a total of 148 juryeligible adults on the first or second day of class in the same introductory-level course.19 4 Of the 148 surveys collected, 6 surveys were
discarded as substantially incomplete or internally inconsistent.
The remaining 142 (96%) were analyzed.
Again, respondents were divided into FV or NV (as defined by
the Juror Study). Ninety-one (64%) were FV; 41 (36%) were NV.
189. The t value equals 2.625.
190. The t value equals 5.13.
191. The t value equals 1.11.
192. The t value equals .642.
193. As noted above, approximately 25% of responses were excluded.
194. The adults were either second-semester freshmen or sophomores ranging in age from 18 to 21 years.
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Results

The results were consistent with those obtained in the Juror
Study and Eligibles #1. As shown in Table VI, Eligibles #2 expressed a propensity toward pro se, but only at lower levels of risk/
jeopardy.
TABLE VI.

EXPRESSED PROPENSITY FOR SELF-REPRESENTATION

(ELIGIBLES

Level of Risk/Jeopardy

Civil low
Criminal low
Civil high
Criminal high

1

#2)

FV (n=91)
Mean
Std. Dev.
.63
.49
.58
.50
.07
.25

NV (n=51)
Mean
Std. Dev.
.30
.46
.24
.43

.04

.08

.75

.27

.08

.27

A meta-analysis of the analyzed responses of the Eligibles Studies on these measures yielded similar results (Table VII). The metaanalysis included 206 respondents of which 136 (66%) were FV and
70 (34%) were NV. Results of pro se propensity as mediated by
risk/jeopardy are displayed in Table VII below.
TABLE

VII.

META-ANALYSIS

(ELIGIBLES/ELIGIBLES)

OF PROPENSITY

FOR SELF-REPRESENTATION AccORDING TO RISK/JEOPARDY

criminal high
civil high
criminal low
civil low

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

These results are also plotted in Table VIII. This chart highlights the similarity of response in high risk/jeopardy situations and
the disparity in response in low risk/jeopardy situations as meahttps://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol11/iss1/1
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sured by frequent viewing. Importantly, Table VIII does not quan-

tify intervening degrees of risk.
TABLE VIII. PRO SE [STUDENT META-ANALYSIS]

70%-

z

50%

0

40%
20%
0%

civil low criminal civil high criminal.
high
low

---

--

FV
NV

RISKI JEOPARDY

The findings of the second study phase of Eligibles #2 also conformed to the findings from the Juror Study. Tables IX and X show
FV distinguished themselves from NV on questions (or measures)
pertaining to propensity toward litigiousness and likelihood of appeaning pro se. (For ease of comparison, these results are shown
along with those of Jurors). Similarly, a meta-analysis of the com-

plete (analyzed) responses of the Eligibles #2 Study and the Juror
Study was conducted on the questions. This yielded a total of 367
filtered responses of which 240 (65%) were FV and 127 (35%) were
NV. These results are shown below.
Although there appeared a striking similarity in response
based on viewing, one difference was the proportion of each group
that considered the option of pro se representation. A larger proportion of both FV and NV Eligibles than Jurors considered this.
Yet, on the litigiousness scale, an equal proportion of both FV noted
they would consider litigation, there was a much sharper drop in
Juror NV than Eligibles NV in pursuing (as opposed to merely considering) a claim. This is shown in Tables XI and XII.
Similarly, meta-analysis was conducted combining the responses of the Juror Sample with those of Eligibles #2 on questions
pertaining to likelihood of litigation and likelihood of representing
themselves pro se. That analysis disclosed the following:
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TABLE

IX. PRO SE JURORS

60%,

TABLE X. PRO SE ELIGIBLES

•70%.
060%
50%
40%

30%

.

20%

F V

..

30% .FV
20%

J

10%-i

-

0%
would
consider
pro se

10%

would
appear
pro se

would
consider
pro se

TABLE XI. LITIGIOUSNESS

TABLE

OF JURORS

would
appear
pro se

XII.

LITIGIOUSNESS

OF ELIGIBLES

90%-.

80/o

1

y.

LM

90%
:80%

,

70%-

70%

60%.

60%

50%.
40%. ,

50%40%-

-

30%-

30%.
20%.

20%

10%

10%

0%.

0%-

would
consider
bringing
claim

would
bring
claim

would
consider
bringing
claim

TABLE

XIII.

would
bring
claim

JURORS + ELIGIBLES

90%
80%
70%
z 60%50%

0
^ 40%
0
030%
20%

FV
-- NV

10%
0%
consider
claim

bring
claim

consider appear
p/s
p/s
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DISCUSSION

Syndi-Court's Influence on Litigiousness

If a case can be made that syndi-court encourages litigation
and pro se representation, the results herein supply a preponderance of evidence supporting that proposition. Cumulatively, the
studies suggest the profile of attitudes expressed by FV conforms
with the dominant imagery of syndi-court, to wit: one celebrating
pro se plaintiffs and litigation over all manner of perceived wrongs
and for all manner of imagined remedies. Hence, syndi-court is a
force of cultivation.
Although a surprisingly large proportion of both FV and NV
state that they would consider litigation, FV are more likely to do
so. 19 5 Furthermore, as shown in Table XII, it appears that considering a claim and bringing a claim are options much closer on a continuum of actually litigating than they are for NV. For FV,
contemplating litigation seems to be a step on the way to not-toodistant action. Perhaps this implies a normative force at work,
where FV have become so comfortable with the pro-litigation norm
broadcast by syndi-court that, when contemplating behavior, they
are prone to act in accord with that previously-defined norm.
FV also express a propensity toward pro se representation rejected by their non-viewing counterparts. As clarified by the

Eligibles Studies, this propensity appears mediated by the degree of
risk/jeopardy that the individual faces. Thus, the pro se propensity
of FV is evidenced in only the "low" risk/jeopardy categories - the
situations most resembling those seen on TV -

but is absent when

the stakes are high risk, i.e., the situations most distinct from those
196
of syndi-court.
Finally, FV entertain very different opinions about appropriate
judge behaviors than do NV. Whereas FV believe that judges

should ask witnesses questions and act aggressively with litigants,
195. Although both the Juror and Eligibles samples disclosed a significant
number of frequent viewers, the Juror sample included a higher proportion of
frequent viewers. This might be explained either by age (younger individuals
watch less television or less day-time television) or college enrollment (collegeaged students are in classes during much of the syndi-court show time, thus, they
watch less syndi-court). Both are consistent with previous findings that college students are "appointment viewers," and watch less television than the average American. See Suzanne Pingree et al., If College Students Are Appointment Television Viewers
.45
J. BROADCASTING & ELECTRONIC MEDIA 446, 457-59 (2001).
196. This might also reflect frequent viewers' propensity to litigate or consider litigating relatively minor disputes. Indeed, the Juror Study suggests FV are
more disposed toward litigation than are NV or, at least, more prone to claiming
they consider it an option.
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NV do not. It appears just as FV look to the model of syndi-court
regarding litigation, so too do they follow its representations regarding judge behavior. These viewers tend to believe real judges
will, and should, act like their syndi-court counterparts. 197
B.

Promoting Litigiousness

The significance of these findings lies in the values syndi-court
promotes, accurate or not, intended or not, about litigation: a cultural acceptance of lawsuits, the perceived commonality of pro se
representation, and reinvisioning of the courtroom as a forum for
all manner of disputes and remedies.
Disputes are not scientific equations, but social constructs,19 8
and syndi-court contributes to those constructions. 19 9 In making
litigious assessments, we look to what others have done 20 0 under
similar circumstances, how they have been treated, and what they
have won or lost (be it in terms of money, time, or social esteem).
Syndi-court provides that very public point of comparison.2 0 1 Unfortunately, the selective presentation of syndi-court incidents distorts the reality and popularity of litigation.
If an individual were to watch just one syndi-court regularly,
that individual would see almost 1,200 plaintiffs per year. Presenting scores of people litigating implies disputing is common behavior, engaged in by ordinary people. 20 2 Litigation is neither reserved
for the rich, nor practiced by the deviant. Rather, litigation is nor197. These differences are the most pronounced among those investigated.
This is not surprising, as the judge behavior, and therefore the message or model
presented to the viewing public, is the most concrete of those studied. Viewers see
"x" behavior from TVjudges and generalize that "x" is how judges behave. There
are no intervening inferences to make or conclusions to draw as there are in understanding statistically popular behavior as a norm guiding behavior.
198. See Felstiner et al., supra note 42, at 631 (maintaining disputes are social
constructs).
199. See Asimow, supra note 4, at 550-51 (claiming pop culture can lead public
opinion and reinforce pre-existing attitudes). Often, "[t]he determinative obstacle to societal norm formation" is sufficient publicity of the action or belief. Id. at
400-01. This is not a problem for syndi-court, which broadcasts to a substantial
audience several hours a day.
200. See Dan Coates and Steven Penrod, Social Psychology and the Emergence of
Disputes, 15 LAw & Soc'v REv. 655, 666-67 (1980-81) (explaining social comparisons influence naming and blaming).
201. Vivid presentations of so-called reality "may impose themselves in the
mind of the audience and begin to serve as a point of reference. Once activated,
this information and these images guide further processing and recall and may
produce systematic distortions in perceptions." Sotirovic, supra note 51, at 752.
202. See Shrum, supra note 126, at 259 ("Content analyses of... reality-based
police programs indicate that, just as with all programming, systematic biases are
apparent.").
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mal. This reduces any stigma associated with the behavior of suing
-

that may deter litigation -

and even replacing it with a societal

endorsement.
The types of disputes showcased on syndi-court also lower the
bar to legal claims. Indeed, the content analysis showed a majority
of disputes sought truly minor sums. No dispute is too minor and
no sum too small to warrant suit. One plaintiff even sued for $11.
This substantially lowers the bar to "legal claims" and opens the
doors to the courtroom much wider for all manner of trifling
20 3
problems.
Many plaintiffs, however, were not seeking compensation for
legal wrongs, but for apologies or recognitions of wrongdoing. Several even noted the unimportance of monetary redress. Though
these emotions are understandable, the noted "remedies" sought
are not within the purview of a court. Perhaps early in the process,
before counsel is involved, or papers are filed, or when one is at St.
Peter's Gate, an apology is valuable legal currency, but in the crucible of the courtroom, it is not legally cognizable. Nonetheless,
syndi-court communicates litigation to address trivial or moral issues is acceptable. Therefore, when comparing their problems to
those on syndi-court, viewers who otherwise may not have considered their dispute worth pursuing might now conclude it deserves
judicial redress.
Furthermore, syndi-court's exclusively pro se rally endorses the

model of pro se representation. Showcasing litigants operating
without the aid of counsel 20 4 portrays pro se representation as both
a reasonable alternative to representation by paid counsel and an
undertaking that anyone can handle. 20 5 In general, this perception
203. "Small claims is never about the money; it's about the principle." Judge
Marilyn Milian, The People's Court (television broadcast, Oct. 16, 2002).
204. In the United States, all individuals possess a constitutional right to
forego counsel and represent themselves pro se. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S.
806, 807 (1975) (describing waiver of counsel in criminal trial). This is grounded
in the Sixth Amendment. See id. at 818; see also U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
205. The consumer movement may also contribute to the popularity of selfrepresentation, emboldening those who believe a reasonably intelligent person
should be able to handle their own legal problems. See L. Karl Branting, An Advisory System for Pro Se Protection Order Applicants, 14 INT'L REV. L., CoMPS., & TECH.
357, 358 (2000) (noting various factors adding to increase in pro se litigants).
"The relatively high education level of pro se litigants - the most common level of
education for pro se litigants is 1-3 years of college - attests to choice, rather than
necessity, as the motivation for many pro se litigants." Id.
Unrepresented litigants can obtain information through a variety of sources,
such as books, kits, and Internet resources. There is even court-sponsored software
such as POA ("Protection Order Advisor"), for pro se litigants seeking orders of
protection. See id. at 362-68 (describing such as developed for use in Idaho).
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evinces some degree of favor toward litigation. Additionally, promotion of pro se as a viable option also diminishes a number of
societal gatekeepers to the courthouse, to wit: the cost of counsel
and a bad legal claim.
Although there is little data supporting an increase in litigation, overall there is evidence of an increase in pro se representation. 20 6 In fact, since the proliferation of syndi-court, those employed by the justice system have insisted "unrepresented litigants
20 8
are flooding the courts" 20 7 and pro se filings have increased.
Though the exact number of pro se litigants is unknown,20 9 their
206. See, e.g., Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 478-79 (noting quantitative data
demonstrating increase in litigation); see also Branting, supra note 205, at 357 (telling of increasing numbers of litigants representing themselves in court); Chris Mahoney, Verdict: Litigants without Attorneys Are on the Rise, 20 B. Bus. J., Sept. 1, 2000,
at 13 (noting number of pro se litigants increasing); Kathleen M. Sampson, Meeting
the Pro Se Challenge: An Update, 84 JUDICATURE 326, 326-28 (2001) (portraying how
self-representation continues to grow).
Court administrators and judges have insisted the number of pro se litigants
has increased sharply. See Russell Engler, And Justicefor All - Including the Under-

represented Poor: Revisiting the Roles of the Judges, Mediators, and Clerks, 67 FORD. L.
REv. 1987, 1987 (1999) (describing flood of pro se litigants into "poor people's
courts").
207. Engler, supra note 206, at 1987 ("This phenomenon is hardly surprising
given widespread reports that over eighty percent of the legal needs of the poor
and working poor currently are unmet in the United States."); see also Branting,
supra note 205, at 357 (telling of increasing numbers of litigants representing
themselves in court).
208. See Alan Feuer, More Litigants Are Taking a Do-It-Yourself Track, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 22, 2001, at BI (describing increase of pro se litigants in New York City).
"[T] he numbers of people representing themselves in court have been increasing
in the city, the state, and the country at a significant rate." Id. (quoting statement
made by New York State Deputy Chief Administrative Judge, Juanita Bing
Newton); see alsoJohn Gibeaut, Turning Pro Se, 85 A.B.A.J. 28, 28 (Jan. 1999) (stating Goldschmidt study "one of two" "charting an increase in the number of people
showing up in court without lawyers"); Mahoney, supra note 208, at 13 (discussing
how court officials insist they see increase in pro se cases); Daisy Whitney, WellDocumented "People" Company Helps Do-lt-Yourselfers with Legal Tasks, DENVER POST,
Aug. 3, 1999, at C-01 (quoting statement made by Sherry Patten, spokesperson for
Colorado Judicial Department, that pro se litigation been on rise over past five
years).
209. See Raul V. Esquivel, III, The Ability of the Indigent to Access the Legal Process
in Family Law Matters, I Lov.J. PUB. INT. L. 79, 93-94 (2000) ("The exact number of
litigants who represent themselves each year is unknown."); see also Mahoney, supra
note 208, at 13 (indicating overall figures of pro se litigants hard to come by).
A repeatedly cited ABA study in the Phoenix area found that at least one party
acted pro se in 24% of the 1980 divorce cases. By 1990, that proportion had increased to 88%. SeeJeff Donn, More Americans Turn To Sue-It-Yourself Law, CHARLESTON GAZErTE & DAILY MAIL, Mar. 7, 1994, at Al, All (noting "American Bar
Association does not keep records" of individuals who "act on their own legal be-

half"); see also Jona Goldschmidt, The Pro Se Litigant's Struggle for Access to Justice:
Meeting the Challenge of Bench and Bar Resistance, 40 FAm. CT. REv. 36, 37-38 (2002)
(characterizing judges attempt to address increasing number of pro se litigants).
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numbers are believed to be significant. 2 10 Courtwatchers, too, attribute the increase in pro se litigation, in part, to the abundance of
court programs on television. 21 1 Furthermore, an assistant court
executive in California related that one pro se litigant explained he
and his wife obtained all of their information about the courts from
watching JudgeJudy.2 12 A circuit court judge in Illinois also associated the rise in self-representation to cameras in the courtroom:
because people can now see what occurs inside the courtroom, they
may believe they are capable of litigating on their own behalf.21 3
Insofar as pro se obviates the necessity of counsel, its popularity
could increase litigation rates. Some have asserted the increase in
See generallyJONA GOLDSCHMIDT ET AL., MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF PRO SE LITIGATION: A REPORT AND GUIDEBOOK FOR JUDGES AND COURT MANAGERS (1998).
210. SeeTerry Carter, Self-Help Speeds Up, 87 A.B.A.J. 34, 34 (July 2001) ("The
bulk of [pro se] representation tends to be in family matters. . . ."); see also Should

Filing Fees Be Increased to Solve the Pro Se Representation Problem?, 29 BCD News and
Comment, Dec. 3, 1996 (indicating despite lack of certain data, number of pro se
litigants believed to be significant).
There have been dramatic increases in the number of pro se litigants in domestic relations disputes. See Branting, supra note 205, at 358; see also Carter, supra
note 210, at 34 (noting increase in landlord-tenant small claims and other cases);
Peter J. Ausili, Outside Counsel: Federal Court Statistics for Fiscal Year 1997, N.Y. L.J.
Apr. 28, 1998, at 1 (noting federal criminal appeals reports show filings have increased slightly each year since 1993). With regard to the latter, though overall
filings in the federal courts of appeals (excluding the Federal Circuit) rose only
1% from 1996 to 1997, of those 52,319 total cases, 42% that were pro se have been
documented. See id. (discussing pro se increase in federal courts); see also Presiding Justice of the Appellate Division, Second Department, Guy Mangano, New Fifth

Department Crucial,N.Y. L.J. [SuPPLEMENT], Jan. 26, 2000, at S1 (describing need for
new appellate department due to increasing case load).
The Boston Bar Association similarly found that, in 75% of divorce cases, at
least one spouse is unrepresented by counsel. See Mahoney, supra note 206, at 13
(stating reports by "the trial court and the Boston Bar Association found that at
least one spouse in two-thirds of divorce cases is unrepresented").
211. See Feuer, supra note 208, at BI (explaining court television shows are
learning instruments for pro se litigants). Pro se litigants also attribute any increase to the cost of legal representation and the popularity of the do-it-yourself
movement. See id.

212. See Marie Higgins Williams, Comment, The Pro Se Criminal Defendant,
Standby Counsel, and theJudge: A Proposalfor Better-Defined Roles, 71 U. COLO. L. REv.
789, 816 (2000) ("Some watch too much JudgeJudy and think it is easy to represent
themselves.").
Another pro se plaintiff considered his watching the Simpson trial a sufficient

legal education. See Feuer, supra note 208, at BI (relating experience of Victor
Montalvo, who is using knowledge gained from television shows to sue Home
Depot).

213. See Higgins Williams, supra note 212, at 816 (attributing rise of pro se
litigants to lessons learned from cameras in courtrooms). "On television, it looks
simple enough: You go to court. You make your case ... [a]fter a few moments and a commercial break - the judge renders a decision." Dante Chinni, MoreAmericans Want to Be Their Own Peny Mason, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 20, 2001, at I
(describing simplicity of arguing cases on self-representation television shows).
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pro se litigation responds to the lack of affordable legal services for
the poor and middle class. 2 14 Aggrieved individuals thus forego assertion of their legal rights because they cannot afford an attorney. 2 15

Pro se representation eliminates this expense, thereby

clearing a path into the courtroom. 2 16 In fact, according to a New
York State Bar Association survey, "[t] he costs of legal services, or
least their perceived cost, is encouraging a trend toward pro se litigation among middle-income New Yorkers...".2 1

7

As pro se litiga-

tion can transform individuals who would otherwise be
economically-barred from suit into litigants, it contributes to
litigiousness.

218

Similarly, pro se representation also eliminates the hurdle of a
bad legal claim to litigation. Even those who wish to litigate cannot
214. See Engler, supra note 206, at 1987 (suggesting up to 80% of legal needs
of indigent are unmet); see alsoJanet Reno, Address Delivered at the Celebration of the
Seventy-Fih Anniversary of Women at Fordham Law School, 63 FoRD. L. REV. 5, 8
(1994) (reporting 80% of poor and "working poor" have no access to legal services); Branting, supra note 205, at 358 (detailing shortfall in legal services for
poor).
215. See Trubek, supra note 20, at 74 (rising litigation costs are barrier for
some potential litigants); see also Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 481 (asserting lawyers'
fees and related charges have "priced out a large number of Americans from the
civil justice system"). But see Eric A. Feldman, Blood Justice, 34 LAw & Soc'y REv.
651, 657 (2000) (claiming access to U.S. courts is inexpensive); Pacquin, supra
note 68, at 30 (stating in empirical study of litigious personalities, few respondents
mentioned cost as barrier to litigation or reason underlying decision to sue or not
to sue).
216. Pro se litigation also impacts the justice system. Court officials claim pro
se litigants' lack of familiarity with the courts bogs down docket, and procreates
frivolous suits. Even where their suits are meritorious, pro se litigants do not understand legal procedures. See Kimberlee K. Kovach, The Lawyer as Teacher: The Role
of Education in Lauyering, 4 CLINICAL L. REv. 359, 370 (1998) (indicating public not
familiar with many legal terms). In addition, few people know about filing deadlines or the documents necessary to initiate legal proceedings. See Branting, supra
note 205, at 358 (stating problems to judicial systems posed by increasing pro se
trend).
217. Gary Spencer, Middle-Income Consumers Seen HandlingLegal Matters Pro Se,
N.Y. L.J., May 29, 1996, at 1 (stating study commissioned by New York State Bar
Association indicates increasing likelihood of middle income people to self represent). That study defined "middle income" as $25,000 to $95,000. See id.
218. This paper does not suggest the Constitutional right to pro se representation be restricted. Instead, it cautions that it may be undertaken by individuals
under the mistaken impression that it is easy or that it might increase avenues for
litigation.
In fact, the Supreme Court has noted the "nearly universal Conviction... that
forcing a lawyer upon an unwilling defendant is contrary to his basic right to defend himself if he truly wants to do so." Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 817,
819 (1975) (holding States can't require citizen to use lawyer); see also United
States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (noting right to selfrepresentation designed to "safeguard dignity and autonomy" of the defendant,
not to achieve "best result in the litigation from a lawyer's point of view").
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do so unless a lawyer agrees to take their case. 21 9 Generally, a lawyer will decline to do so where a viable claim is absent and/or the
220
likelihood of success or significant monetary recovery is low.

Therefore, just as the expense of counsel may prevent people from
suing, so may an attorney's refusal or expert opinion that the case is
meritless. If a person acts without counsel, she circumvents such
refusal, and, in spite of a meritless claim, can initiate litigation. Unfortunately, eschewing counsel in favor of self-representation might
also cause one to lose a very winnable claim.
C.

Study Limitations

Despite the studies' strong relational conclusions, they cannot
substitute for causation. Because one cannot isolate the influence
of television as a variable, 2 21 social science can never prove cultivation of attitudes favoring litigation. 2 22 Consequently, it cannot be
determined with certainty whether and how the messages of syndicourt might interact with the individuals that view them or simply
2 23
reflect some other trait shared by FV.

For instance, views regarding litigation or pro se representation may merely catalog individual predispositions toward litigiousness. Additionally, the type of person who opts for selfrepresentation or pursues litigation might also be the type of person who likes to watch syndi-court. Thus, viewers already prone to
litigiousness selectively expose themselves to syndi-court content.
Similarly, these individuals may be more inclined than the average
person to attempt pro se representation, sue, and favor the model
219. See Hans, supra note 17, at 10-11 (observing how civil jury signals potential litigants and lawyers, informing their decisions to pursue claims, accept cases,
or agree to settlements).
220. See Do We Know, supra note 22, at 1190-92 (describing low probability of
attorney agreeing to represent client if he foresees small economic benefit or little
chance of success); see also Daniels & Martin, supranote 78, at 484 (explaining how
court costs and weak cases lead 57% of lawyers to represent smaller percentage of
clients than five years ago). "As a result, the client with a small, but legitimate
claim may not be able to find a competent attorney, or have his or her claim successfully settled." Id. at 485.
221. "From the cultivation point of view, the television system cannot be isolated and separated in terms of a traditional independent variable or stimulus[.]"
Patrick R6ssler & Hans-Bernd Brosius, Do Talk Shows Cultivate Adolescents' Views of
the World? A Prolonged-ExposureExperiment, 51J. Comm. 143, 147 (2001) (indicating
difficulty of performing experiments to test cultivation) (citation omitted).
222. See id. (noting cultivation studies do not permit causal interpretation of
data).
223. Particularly in our media-saturated culture, it is not possible to restrict
the analysis to one of a micro-level learning process.
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of judges as expressed on television. 224 These individuals may be
more interested in trials than the average person or be contentious
by nature. Therefore, these individuals seek out entertainment that
satisfies these appetites.
Accepting the saturation of media, including syndi-court, in
our culture, it is difficult to imagine how this problem could be
cured through an alternative study design. In a culture that
watches somewhere between 230-375 hours of television yearly, 225 it
would be impossible to isolate even individual predispositions from
their genesis in media imagery.
Furthermore, education level 2 26 and legal expertise provide an
alternate explanation for the results. For instance, previous research has found education level is a strong predictor of opinions
regarding crime policy.2 27 Generally, more educated people are

likely to have and employ more complex ways of thinking. 22 8 In
relation to this, the level of legal understanding could mediate any
propensity to litigate. People who better understand the law and
legal system might better assess the strength of a potential claim as
well as weigh the costs and benefits of litigation.
Nonetheless, though one would expect those with a better legal understanding to make better decisions regarding litigation,
which decision-making process may not translate to fewer suits, but,
rather, a redistributionof types of cases and wins. Presumably, more
knowledgeable individuals would litigate stronger claims (that less
educated individuals may not recognize) and would not litigate
weaker claims that the less educated might pursue. Hence, knowledge would be independent of litigious tendencies. In fact, one
study has shown past experience with the justice system has no con224. This motivational aspect has also been analyzed in traditional cultivation
theory. See Margaret Reith, Viewing of Crime Drama and AuthoritarianAggression: An
Investigation of the Relationship Between Crime Viewing, Fear, and Aggression, 43 J.
BROADCASTING

& ELECTRONIC

MEDIA

211, 211 (1999) (discussing competing theo-

ries for why people watch crime dramas). For instance, Gerbner asserted people
watched crime dramas by "accident." See id. Zillman suggested people who feared
crime sought these out purposely (and, thus, this explained the positive correlation between viewing and fear of crime). See id.
225. For a discussion of television viewing hours, see supra notes 125-26 and
accompanying text.
226. Data regarding education level was not collected in the Juror Study. Although it was known in the Eligibles Studies, the potential influence of this variable was not analyzed. See infra note 230 and accompanying text.
227. Sotirovic, supra note 51 ("Education widens the scope of one's acquaintance with different ideas and facts and increases the capacity to perceive implications of certain events.").
228. See id.
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nection to attitudes favoring syndi-court-styled judicial behaviors or
of heavy syndi-court viewing. 229 Consequently, there is no reason to
believe overall education level would exact an independent effect
here.
Although education level was not a variable in either study, respondents in the Eligibles Studies all had completed at least one
semester of college education. Therefore, when contemplating education as a potential explanatory factor, respondents in the
Eligibles Studies may be used as a point of comparison. 230 At least
with regard to viewership and propensity toward pro se representation, FV and NV Eligibles Studies respondents expressed views in
line with those of FV and NVJuror Study respondents. 23 1 Thus, at
least according to this measure, the effect of college education on
attitude is not immediately apparent. Furthermore, what little empirical evidence exists, does not support the notion that syndi-court
viewers are any different from television viewers generally. Indeed,
the millions of syndi-court viewers represent a wide variety of demo2
graphic ranges. 23
Finally, an overwhelming majority of viewers23 3 reported they
would consider litigation, and half said they would pursue it. This
relatively large consensus raises questions about the genesis of the
pro-litigation attitudes and behaviors. In fact, proportion of
229. See Podlas, supra note 4, at 14, 22 (discussing study showing no effect on

frequent syndi-court viewers by judicial system experience).
230. In fact, there is evidence individuals who have completed some college
constitute the largest proportion of pro se litigants. This college background may
explain the difference in the proportions of Eligibles versus Jurors who expressed
a propensity toward pro se litigation. The results reported herein showed a larger
proportion of Eligibles - who all had at least one year of college education - than
Jurors expressing a preference for pro se litigation.
231. Additionally, research has shown college students are somewhat different from the general public with regard to their television viewing (much academic debate of late regarding students as viewers). See Pingree, supra note 195, at
450 (noting differences in Nielson data). Indeed, Pingree's study of 731 college
students found they tended to be selective viewers with their available time. See id.
at 455. They are "appointment viewers," who choose to watch particular shows, by
appointment. See id. at 455-56, 458. Additionally, or as a result, college students
tend to be lighter viewers than the general public. See id. at 457 (confirming earlier studies). "Despite generally easy access to television, students clearly do not
simply spend their free time casually viewing television." Id. at 459. This departs
from Nielsen data available for the aged 18 to 34 cohort. See Pingree, supra note
195, at 459 (discussing television viewing habits of college students).
232. One additional characteristic deserves note: the differences between the
sample groups. The student sample group(s), i.e., those who favor disputing, is
both younger than the juror sample group, and grew up in a time of syndi-court
prominence.
233. For a discussion of viewers reports, see supra note 195 and accompanying
text and Tables X-XII.
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Eligibles was even larger. This may suggest some factor other than
syndi-court viewing accounts for such litigious attitudes. Although
this suggestion might undercut the explanatory value of syndicourt, it might underscore the operation of normative development
via television.
It must be remembered, because NV do not watch syndi-court,
they would not be expected to express attitudes in line with what FV
see daily on syndi-court. One example is the rather active and aggressive behavior of judges. NV simply would not see these particular behaviors, so would not think them common or acceptable.
Indeed, the statistical evidence supports this conclusion. Table III
shows FV and NV exhibited their most pronounced differences on
opinions regarding expected judicial behaviors: FV expected real
judges to behave like those they had seen constantly on syndi-court,
whereas NV, who had never been exposed to such behaviors,
tended to expect behaviors more consistent with reality.
General attitudes toward litigiousness, however, are not wholly
confined within the purview of syndi-court broadcasts; they are evidenced in places other than syndi-court, and, therefore, would be
known to, or integrated by, NV. As previously noted, the last decade has marked a great deal of publicity about the litigation explosion. The residual effect of this publicity (or its truth) might
explain the high proportion of NV contemplating litigation. Moreover, even if NV do not watch syndi-court, they are undoubtedly
aware of the proliferation of these quasi-courtrooms. The popularity of syndi-court might positively shape dispositions toward considering litigation. Nevertheless, despite NV's degree of preference
for considering or pursuing litigation, it was significantly different,
i.e., lower, than that of FV, thus supporting some impact of syndicourt.
V.

CONCLUSION

As Neil Postman said, "No medium is excessively dangerous if
its users understand what its dangers are. ''2 3 4 Consequently, as

syndi-court's de facto role as a legal messenger increases, legal practitioners and theoreticians are obliged to discern its influence on
litigation and the public's propensity to litigate.
For some, syndi-court is lively "infotainment"; for others, it is
the bastard of the legal system; for all, it is a normative messenger
telling us what society deems "right" and "wrong" about litigation.
234. POSTMAN, supra note 148.
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It appears, however, syndi-court tells the public litigation and disputing are so common as to be devoid of stigma, pro se representa-

tion is an easy and viable option for those who cannot afford or find
an attorney to take their case, and virtually anything deserves to be
litigated. Not only does syndi-court cultivate attitudes, and possibly
behaviors, favoring litigation, it also promotes unrealistic beliefs
about the ease and popularity of litigation. 235
Certainly, amassing evidence that syndi-court has indeed influenced society's construction of disputes or propensity toward litigation will take time. Changes in symbolic environments such as
these are like changes in the natural environment: they do not happen all at once, but are gradual and additive at first, then suddenly
reach critical mass. 23 6

Yet, at worst, 23 7 these studies quantify and

qualify opinions held by FV of syndi-court; at best, they describe the
attitudes and behaviors that syndi-court cultivates. The former cautions that a large portion of the public already possesses a sensitivity
toward the pro-litigation messages of syndi-court; the latter alerts us

that the public is learning from syndi-court and is on the cusp of
translating those beliefs to litigious behavior, 2 38 as seen on TV.
235. "Whatever the visual mass media touch bear the mark of reality/fiction
confusion."

RicHARD K. SHERWIN, WHEN LAW GOES Pop, THE VANISHING LINE BE-

TWEEN LAW AND POP CULTURE 8 (2000); see also Scottoline, supra note 158, at 656

(stating "right now in the popular culture, there is an almost complete merger of
fiction and reality when it comes to the law").
236. See POSTMAN, supra note 148, at 27.
237. The noted methodological hurdles notwithstanding.
238. Cognitions are intermediary steps between the content on television and
ultimate behaviors. See Shrum, supra note 126, at 260 (explaining television portrayals influence beliefs of viewers in series of cognitions). This is consistent with

the belief real-world television effects may not manifest themselves as direct links
between viewing and behavior, but work in a slower, subtler fashion. See id.
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